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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three empirical essays in industrial organization using data
from an anonymous retailer. All these chapters examine some facet of consumer behavior. The
first chapter estimates demand for store and national brand over-the-counter pain relievers.
There is evidence that the substitution patterns between store and national brands are starkly
asymmetric- price cuts by national brands steal more share from store brands than store brand
price cuts steal share from national brands. Another distinguishing characteristic between
store and national brand products is that store brands can be found at only one retailer while
national brands are found virtually anywhere. I find that an increase in the number of competing
local retailers is associated with an increase (decrease) in store brand (national brand) share,
which is consistent with the unique availability of store brands. In the second chapter, I
investigate consumer inventory behavior and find that the increase in quantity resulting from
a sale is in large part due to stockpiling motives. For example, using field experiment data, the
estimated increase in consumption (net of stockpiling) is close to zero for the product categories
mouthwash, diapers, and chocolate. I also identify a selection bias when one uses store-level
data to estimate the impact of price on quantity. The third chapter evaluates the effectiveness
of lowering prices versus just claiming prices are lower on demand, and how this relates to
consumer price knowledge. Using a large-scale field test in which we varied both actual price
(in the absence of any cue) and claimed price, we find that the response of these two effects is
positively correlated. A likely explanation for this positive correlation is that customers simply
care more about the prices of some products than others. Also, customers respond more to
low prices on items for which they have good price knowledge, but respond more to low price
claims when their price knowledge is poor, although this is a second order effect.
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Chapter 1
Store Brand and National Brand
Demand Characteristics: The Case
of Over-The-Counter Pain Relievers
1.1 Introduction
Over the past couple decades, private label (PL) brands have had incredible success in stealing
share from traditionally strong national brands in many markets and continue to perform well
today. For products sold in supermarkets, mass merchandisers, and drug chains, Hoch et
al. (2002) find that 193 out of 225 categories sold in these retail outlets exhibited at least a
1% increase per year in PL's dollar market share during the period 1987-1994. The upward
trend has continued since then in all three classes of retailers (Steiner 2004). Store brands
achieve about $50 billion of current business per year, and account for one out of every five
items sold by US retailers (PLMA). In this data set which includes analgesic sales in 2003
from a particular retailer, PL products account for about 30% of all revenue, and even has the
majority share of revenue for aspirin-type analgesics. Private label visibility continues to grow
and consumers today are certainly aware of the availability of PL products when making their
purchasing decisions.
There is a rich marketing literature focusing on the differences between PL and national
brands1 . For example, PL products are priced lower, perceived to have inferior quality, and
generally do not advertise at the national level. In a large scale study involving 34 food
categories in the 50 largest retail markets, Dhar and Hoch (1997) find that the level of PL
prices is 60% of the level of national brand prices2 . Various surveys have found that consumers
as well as quality assurance managers perceive PL products to be of lower quality (Hoch and
Banerji 1993).
This paper investigates two aspects of demand for private label and national brand products.
The first is that private labels compete directly with national brands for market share, and an
empirical investigation of demand would inform us about the degree of substitutability between
these two types of products. To this end, we employ the Almost Ideal Demand System due to
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to estimate demand for four major categories of analgesics at a
chain retailer. The second aspect of private label demand we examine is the intrinsic difference
in the availability of PL and national brands. A retailer's private label can be found only at
the retailer's own stores, while national brands can be found virtually anywhere.
The four different categories or segments of OTC analgesics we study are acetaminophen,
aspirin, ibuprofen, and naproxen. The national brands for each of these segments are the
familiar brand names Tylenol; Bayer and Ecotrin; Advil and Motrin; and Aleve respectively.
Although each of the drugs generally treat pain, fevers, and headaches, there are some differences
between the analgesic types. While aspirin, naproxen, and ibuprofen are non steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), acetaminophen is not. Thus, acetaminophen is used to treat
headaches and fevers, but this chemical has no effectiveness in treating inflammation due to
sprains or arthritis. Naproxen is especially effective as a NSAIDs. As a pain reliever, aspirin
is used for headaches but is rough on the digestive track. Aspirin in low doses is also used
for heart therapy, but as our focus is on pain relievers, we limit attention to high dose aspirin.
Ibuprofen is similar to aspirin, but is gentler on the stomach and targets a different chemical
pathway.
We chose the analgesics product category to study store and national brand demand because
there is a large presence of PL products in this category for our retailer. There is a PL
1By national brands, we mean leading national brands and not smaller fringe national brands.
2Studying data from Dominick's supermarkets in Chicago, Ailawadi et al. (2003) also find that almost all
national brands have a higher mean retail price than private labels.
counterpart for every analgesic-type, and they are placed directly on the shelf next to the
national brand3 . Other product categories have very low PL share penetration, or do not have
any PL products at all. In the analgesics category however, consumers are exposed to many
PL brand products and purchase a great deal of store brands as revenue shares are very high.
We point out that for analgesics, the store brands are very similar in nature to the national
brand products so that we consider them both as differentiated products in the same market,
as opposed to two distinct product markets. Both national and store brands are chemically
identical in terms of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) of the drugs, and The Food
and Drug Administration regulates OTC analgesics, where the generics are considered to be
as safe, effective, and work as fast as national brands. Also, sometimes consumers consider
national brands to be superior to that of store brands because national brands often introduce
some type of new product innovation. For example, Gillete may introduce a razor with three
titanium blades and a battery powered mechanism which might be considered very different
than the store brand with a plastic handle and one blade. The innovations in the analgesics
product category largely come in the form of the pill, like gelcaps or caplets instead of tablets.
However, this retailer's private label brand also has gelcaps and caplets as well. So national
and PL brand products can also be thought of as being somewhat similar in the method of
delivery, and at the very least, they are chemically identical in terms of API.
Besides our choice of product category, the disaggregated nature of the data set itself is
also useful in examining direct substitution behavior between two products. The data are
collected at high frequency at the store level which implies we observe prices for products
that consumers actually see on the shelf, in an actual store. This gives a more transparent
interpretation of the model as compared to when using more aggregated data, say regional
average prices derived from many different retailers. For example, in more aggregated data,
some purchasing consumers might visit their local store that does not carry a PL product, or
may be unaware of price promotions by PL's in other areas. It is reassuring that in this setting,
any consumer that purchases a national brand product was also presented with the PL brand
alternative directly on the shelf.
3Scott-Morton and Zettlemeyer (2004) provide both theoretical and empirical support to show that retailers
introduce PL brands that mimic the packaging of national brands as a strategic tool to lower wholesale costs of
the national brand products.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. One, demand patterns between PL and
national brand products are explored. How consumers substitute between PL and national
brands is a topic that has generated substantial interest in the marketing literature, and has
been focused on whether a price promotion by a national brand like Tylenol hurts store brands
more than store brand price promotions hurt Tylenol. Blattberg and Wisneiwski (1989) intro-
duce this concept of "asymmetric switching," and many other authors have provided empirical
support by focusing on cross-price elasticities (Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar 2000). These pat-
terns are important for national brands that are considering price promotions both because they
spend large amounts on promotional activity4 and need to understand where to target their
promotions, but also because these price reductions are inducing switching behavior from cus-
tomers normally buying other brands. As national brands are typically thought to have a large
and loyal mass of inframarginal consumers, cutting prices can decrease profits significantly, but
are at least partially offset when consumers are willing to switch from the store brand. For the
store brand, if it can never induce customers of other brands to try their products when they
run price promotions, they may rarely go on sale and use other means to attract customers.
Although not the focus of this paper, we do observe that sales for PL products are much more
infrequent than sales of national brands.
Recently, Sethuraman and Sprinivasan (2002) argue that the pattern of cross-elasticities will
be asymmetric simply because smaller store brands have low market share, and that researchers
should focus instead on how the price of a national brand affects the share of the PL brand and
vice versa. They go on to show that in fifteen previous studies of grocery products that had low
private label share, the asymmetry is often reversed- price cuts by PLs hurt national brands
more than national brands' price cuts hurt PLs. In the aspirin and the ibuprofen segments for
our data, cross elasticities can be used to examine asymmetric switching because PL share is
actually very high. Thus, I still find that national brand price cuts hurt PL share more than
PL price cuts hurt national brands, which contrasts with what Sethuraman and Sprinivasan
4Nondural goods manufacturers spend more on promotional activity than on advertising (Blattberg, Briesch,
and Fox 1995). Promotional activity primarily consists of trade deals, in-store displays, and coupons to cus-
tomers. A trade deal is when a manufacturer lowers the wholesale costs it charges to downstream retailer,
where part of the agreement is to lower retail prices in the store. For example, if Bayer wants to drop the price
of its regularly priced $5.99 bottle of aspirin in supermarket X to $4.99, it might lower the wholesale price to
supermarket X by $1.
find.
Two, we find evidence that the amount of local competition among retailers affects PL
and national brand shares differently, which is a reasonable outcome given that consumers can
shop at different locations for national brands while they can only purchase PL products at one
retailer. PL managers make similar claims, and it is stated on the Private Label Manufacturers
Association website that "retailers know that consumers can buy a national brand anywhere,
but they can only buy their store brand at their stores." While the previous result examines
how national and PL brands compete for intra-store demand, this result offers insight as to how
PL and national brands compete for inter-store demand. Although we do not claim to identify
a causal effect, we find the result interesting nonetheless as there is no empirical work on this
issue that we know of.
Three, this paper complements existing literature on demand estimation of drugs by focusing
on a set of drugs where a consumer's choice set is not constrained by a physician's prescription.
Previous work has found little cross-elasticities across classes of drugs perhaps due to the
prescription-writing stage (Ellison et al. 1997). When a doctor writes a prescription for a
particular class of drug, the patient is then constrained to decide whether to purchase either
the branded, or if available, the generic version of the drug. As doctors do not ultimately pay
the price of the drugs they prescribe, it is not surprising that doctors are typically less aware of
the relative prices of various classes of drugs and may explain the lack of cross-elasticities for
chemically different drugs. The one article that we know of that estimates demand for OTC pain
relievers employs a discrete choice model primarily because of data constraints (Chintagunta
2002). Although he finds significant own-price elasticities, he finds little to no cross elasticities,
admitting that his model constrains cross elasticities, and calls for a less restrictive specification.
Given the richness of our data set, we circumvent such model restrictions by estimating a flexible
demand system. We find cross-elasticities to be important for analgesics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 presents the
model of demand, Section 4 presents the estimation and results, and Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Data
Our data set is from a retailer that sells consumer packaged goods. We observe purchases
of all OTC pain relievers at the SKU (stock keeping unit) level from January 2003 until October
2004 at the individual store week level. The retailer has many stores in the US, for which we
have data for 111 of them. The stores for which we have data are located mostly in the Midwest
and Deep-South areas of the US.
For any particular SKU, we observe paid price and quantity sold at the store-week level. In
addition, we observe the number of pills in each bottle, and the API, which we use to obtain
the price per pill5 . Both the national and store brands have multiple different presentations
of the product like tablets, caplets, or gelcaps, different bottle sizes that range from 24 pills
to 200 pills per bottle, and different amounts of API that is found on the packaging of all the
products. A complementary data set includes store-level demographics for these stores in the
year 2004 like population density, and median income. It also includes the number of stores of
other competing retailers in the neighboring area. We discuss this data set at the end of this
section. Recall the four types of analgesics or segments we study are acetaminophen, aspirin,
ibuprofen, and naproxen where Figure 1 below shows a product tree classifying each national
and PL brand into segments6 . Overall, these brands account for over 90% of all revenues in the
raw data, and we chose brands if they accounted for at least 15% of revenue in their segment7 .
We always include the private label irrespective of its share, where the lowest PL share is 10%.
In this way, we keep the most ubiquitous
Figure 1 - Analgesics Product Tree
5See Table 1.0 for exact definition of price per pill, which takes into account the API of different strength
pills.
6We will use the terms brand and product interchangeably.
7Lowest brand coverage is in the aspirin segment where the three brands Bayer, Ecotrin, and PL Aspirin
account for 74% of that segments share. This can be attributed to more fringe brands in the aspirin segment
as well as the exclusion of low dose heart therapy brands like St. Josephs which account for 10% of the share.
We feel somewhat justified about this exclusion as one may consider aspirin low dose heart therapy as a separate
market, having different coatings to prevent long-term damage to the lining of the stomach, and very high prices
per API (active pharmeuctical ingredient). Some may inquire about the arbitrage opportunities for those people
considering purchasing regular strength aspirin and cutting pills to obtain the benefits of low-dose aspirin at a
lower cost. Besides losing the benefits of the enteric coating from such action, geltabs and caplets cannot be
ingested once cut.
Analgesics
A cetaminophen Aspirin Ibuprofen Naproxen
na-
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tional brands and their PL counterparts.
A major shortcoming of the data is that we only observe prices when there is a purchase,
so there is little price information about products that are purchased infrequently. We address
this issue first by selecting SKUs that are frequently purchased based on the criterion that
prices are observed in at least 2000 store-week combinations anywhere in our data, which
averages to observing prices for 18 weeks per store. As different stores will in general offer
different products, this criterion will choose those SKUs that are typically available throughout
all stores. There is strong evidence that the different stores of this retailer all offer the same
high-selling products, as it is quite possible that stores offer different products to cater to local
tastes. However, 87% of the SKUs that pass our criterion are available in all 111 stores, and
the remaining 13% of SKUs are available in 110 stores.
Finally, without further justification, the above 2000 store-week criterion would select prod-
ucts with very little price information. Although one could impose stricter criteria and choose
SKUs with more price information, this would greatly reduce the fraction of revenues covered
by the included data, and we would be less confident about the empirical results that are based
on a smaller set of SKUs. Fortunately, we take advantage of the retailer's pricing structure to
greatly reduce the number of missing prices.
Like many other large retailers, pricing decisions are made by upper management at head-
quarters, so local store managers have little control over pricing in their store. Stores can be
though of as first being classified by regional area (e.g. Mid-Atlantic, Deep-South, and Mid-
west), and then store are further subdivided into what we will call "districts", where SKU prices
are all the same for stores within a district. Districts in my data can sometimes have only a
few stores, but there are also some fairly large districts. For example, some districts has more
than ten stores. To see how this is useful in balancing our data set, consider those stores in a
district with say 15 stores. As long as there is one purchase of the product somewhere in that
district for a given week, we observe this price for all other 14 storess .
Finally, any remaining missing prices can be inferred from previous weeks as prices do not
change much from week to week. To support this claim, Figures 2.1-2.3 plot time series of
prices for SKUs that have very high price information, a 100 count bottle of Bayer and the
private label 100 count bottle, both from the aspirin segment. Figures 2.1-2.3 are each a plot
for a random store located in each of the regions, Mid-Atlantic, Deep-South, and the Midwest.
Bayer prices are somewhat sticky, with prices often not changing for weeks at a time. It
is interesting that the PL brand prices shows even more stickiness as prices do not move for
months at a time, which would be consistent with asymmetric switching, or the inability of
PL brand promotions to attract customers that usually buy national brand products. The
variation in prices occur from promotions that are held typically for a week or slightly longer,
and from more long term changes in prices that are of much smaller magnitude. Thus, most
of the variation we use to identify the price variable will come from these promotions. Figures
3.1-3.3 plot additional time series of prices for the segment acetaminophen for a 50 count bottle
of Tylenol and the PL version. Again, prices are generally sticky and the PL brand prices are
generally more sticky than Tylenol prices.
There are some other salient properties that can be observed from these graphs. As ex-
pected, private label prices are lower than the national brands. Furthermore, while there is
some independent variation in prices across different regions, especially more so for the aceta-
minophen prices (Figure 3.1-3.3), promotions of national brand products are highly correlated
across different regions of the US. For example, if a store in the Mid-Atlantic is having a pro-
motion on Bayer aspirin, then it is very likely that all of the retailer's stores in this data set
will also have the same price promotion. This phenomena will be important later for the
identification of the price variable in our demand equation. If these national prices are drop-
sIn the raw data, after calculating the modal price for each SKU, zone, week combination, 94% of the raw
data matched the mode. The 6% of data that did not match the mode was typically within 10 cents of the
mode price, and if store B's price was slightly different than the modal price in say the beginning of January,
then store B usually would be different than the mode for some consecutive weeks before that period. This is
likely due to more permanent shelf price changes occuring once a year in the stores at different times because
of store heterogeneity. It appears that store managers are given a rough schedule to complete the shelf price
changes, and some managers finish this task earlier than others. These shelf price changes occur probably to
adjust prices for inflation or local demand conditions, to change the product positioning on the shelfs, and also
perhaps as an overall maintanenance function. We take this into account when entering missing prices for a
store that is consistently different from the mode.
ping because of supply side shocks, e.g., changes to input prices or increases in inventory, then
this price variation would be exogenous to the demand equation. It could also be that prices
are responding to national demand shocks, e.g., winter months, flu season, or during national
advertising campaigns, which we will specifically model in our econometric specification in the
next section.
Table 1.0 lists all the variables and their definitions used in the rest of the tables, which has
been included for ease of access. Table 1.1 contains summary statistics for our brands and the
first column, # of SKUs, indicates the number of products that passed our criterion 9. The
acetaminophen and ibuprofen segments have the most SKUs in our analysis, as seen by the #
of SKUs variable. They also sell more often, as shown by the last column, Segment Share,
which calculates market shares for each chemical type in the raw data. The second column,
% Revenue SKUs, indicates how much of the total revenue of that brand we have captured
with the SKUs that pass our criterion. For Tylenol, the 11 SKUs that are used in our analysis
account for 80% of all revenues in the Tylenol brand. The numbers are reassuring, as our
products account for most of the revenue shares. The next column, or Product Share, is the
variable we use in the subsequent econometric model and should be compared to the column
labeled Brand Share. One can calculate Product Share by restricting the universe of products
to only the qualifying SKUs, and then calculating market shares that sum to 1. Brand Share
is calculated similarly, but includes all SKUs in the raw data. Given that we are selecting
certain SKUs, our product shares used in our analysis could be very different than the overall
brand shares calculated using the raw data. Our hope is that we do not unfairly misrepresent
a brand's share, as this could bias our elasticity estimates which is a function of share. The
shares match up relatively well because we use so many SKUs in our analysis1 .
Now we turn our attention to the data set containing 2004 store-level demographics, which
was provided to us by the chain retailer. It is likely that they obtained this data from an outside
source, perhaps a realtor's database which collects this information at a very local level. First
9Although each SKU usually corresponded to one product on the shelf, sometimes a given SKU could refer
to multiple products on the shelf. For example, Bayer aspirin 50 count tablets and caplets might be coded as
one SKU.
10For example, if using only the top-selling SKU to represent each segment, shares calculated in this way would
be grossly misrepresented. The product PL aspirin would have an average share of 16% when in the raw data,
it represents 39% of the data.
we assume that this demographic data is time-invariant, which is a fairly reasonable assumption
given the short 2-year time horizon of our data. Table 1.2 contains basic summary statistics for
these variables, defined within a 2-radius of the focal store. Our main variable of interest here
is the Competition variable, the number of stores of other large retailers that compete with our
retailer. The mean value of Competition is 1.3 competitors, and has a fairly large standard
deviation of 1.9. The Competition variable does not include small "mom-and-pop" stores, but
only larger chain stores. On average, this retailer has 0.45 other stores within the area as seen
by the OwnStores variable. Some other demographics give us a sense of the environment in
which our stores are located. The average value of PopDensity, or the population density per
square mile is 1,743, which is around that of the cities Indianapolis, IN, or Little Rock, AK.
The variable MedianInc, which was reported to us as the median income of individuals within
a 2-mile radius is around $35,769 and AvgAge, or the average age of people in the vicinity of
our store is about 38.17 years old. These demographic variables exhibit considerable variation
as seen by the high standard deviations 1
Table 1.3 reports the correlation coefficients for the demographic variables. For example, the
correlation between PopDensity and AvgAge is -0.424, and indicates that more densely pop-
ulated locations are associated with a younger population. Competition and OwnStores are
highly correlated with each other and with Pop-Density. For example, the correlation between
Competition and PopDensity is 0.729 and also very high for OwnStores and PopDensity, at
a value of 0.56 which is intuitive, as more dense areas will have more stores. It is important
that we include these controls to reduce concerns of omitted variable bias.
1.3 Model
The model of demand we use is a variant of the model of multistage budgeting due to
Gorman (1971) 12. Products can be partitioned into segments so that choice within a segment
is made conditional on a choice of that segment. A product tree is constructed to represent
the two stage approach. On the bottom level of the tree, each node represents a product, while
"1Other summary statistics of these variables have been excluded to conceal the identity of the chain retailer.
12Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) use a very similar model of demand for beer brands. See their paper
for a discussion of the model.
the top level represents a coarser partition of the products. In this framework, a consumer first
decides what type of analgesic she wants to buy, and then chooses what product to purchase
within this type of analgesic (see Figure 1). For example, a consumer may first choose the
ibuprofen segment based on the average price of ibuprofen and its segment attributes, and
then, conditional on the segment choice, choose to purchase the Advil brand product. We will
refer to the top level as segments, while individual products at the bottom level will be referred
to as products or brands.
We use this model of demand instead of a logit type model as it allows for relatively free
estimation of elasticities between pairs of products, especially those in the same segment at the
bottom level. In other words, the cross-price elasticities between a national brand and PL in the
same segment is freely estimated, up to a functional form assumption. Although a nested logit
model could be employed, substitution patterns within a nest are still driven by market shares,
which would be a very restrictive assumption when our purpose is to examine substitution
patterns between national and PL brands. We emphasize again that the primary purpose of
using this model is to flexibly estimate substitution patterns between PL and national branded
products.
Examining the product tree in Figure 1 imposes two kinds of structure to our data. The
first is the two-stage budgeting structure itself, which we impose for the usual and practical
reason to reduce the number of elasticities to be estimated. Without any structure, we would
estimate one equation for each brand with prices of every product as regressors so that in total
we would estimate close to 100 price parameters, which would lead to difficult problems of
estimation.
The second structure we add, deals with the way in which we have partitioned the products.
While we could have partition the products in a different way, we use this particular two-stage
budgeting system for two additional reasons. Segmenting our products by the type of analgesic
accords with the way in which each chemical type treats different conditions. A second reason
is that it meshes well with the way in which the retailer positions the analgesics products within
the store. Figure 1 is actually a very good map of how products are placed on the shelf. One
section of an aisle will contain acetaminophen-type pain relievers, where Tylenol and the store
brands are placed on this shelf. Another section will contain aspirin-type pain relievers with
Bayer and the PL on this shelf. Conceptually, a consumer who walks into the store might first
decide which section or analgesic type to visit based on the average price per dose, and then is
automatically faced with the national brand and PL alternative.
At the bottom level, our specification is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton
and Muellbauer which allows for a flexible demand system specification. The AIDS system
was originally developed because it aggregates over individuals up to a representative consumer,
and that the demand function of the representative consumer satisfied the conditions specified
by economic theory. We want to make clear that we do not use the AIDS system for this
reason. Our primary motivation is that it provides a functional form that is flexible at the
bottom level, and also has been used in much of the previous literature, to allow a more ready
comparison with past work. The functional form of the top level is derived from the Gorman
result of two-stage budgeting, and we implement it to be consistent with the past literature.
Finally, in keeping with a flexible demand system at the bottom level, we do not impose any
symmetry constraints 1 .
Turning to the actual formulation of the model, first we map the individual SKU prices
Pknt, indexed by k, to product prices Pjnt where j indexes a product at the bottom level of the
tree. The equation to calculate product prices is:
Pint = S(kn Pknt
k
where Skn is the overall revenue share of product k in store n. Notice that Skn does not depend
on time t, so that the only variation in our product price Pjnt within a store comes from changes
in the prices of SKUs.
The model has two levels corresponding to the two-stage budgeting decision of the consumer.
Conditional on the choice of some segment, a consumer chooses one of the products within the
segment. Thus, the bottom level will have one estimating equation per brand (since shares
must sum to one, one equation is redundant for every segment). For some segment, or analgesic
laImposing symmetry constraints would rule out the possibility of asymmetric switching behavior ex ante, a
phenomena we are interested in.
type indexed by G, we estimate the bottom level for a particular product with the equation:
Sint = ain + B log(YGnt/PGnt) +
I
Z i" ' log(Pint) + wt + trendt + eint
j=1
where i denotes a product (a node at the bottom level), n denotes a city, and t denotes time.
On the left hand side, Sint refers to the revenue share of product i. The right hand side
variables are YGnt/PGnt, the overall segment revenue YGnt divided by a segment price index
PGnt, and Pint, the prices of the other products in the segment. YGnt/PGnt plays the role of
quantity in the top level equation below. The number of prices in the bottom level will depend
on the number of products in the segment. For example, since the segment acetaminophen
has two products there will be two prices, Pint and P2nt, in the estimating equation. Other
right hand side variables include trendt, a time trend, ain, store-specific fixed effect for each
brand and wt, month-year dummies. PGnt is a Stone weighted price index and is defined as
log(PGnt) = -1 sS in log(Pint).
In the above model, the inclusion of a store-specific fixed effect ain for each brand results
in identification of the price parameters from within store variation and captures the effect of
time-invariant variables. ain would control for demographic demand shifters, local preferences
for the brand, and shelf space allotted to the brand. The month-year dummies wt accounts
for demand shifters that affect all stores like changes in overall tastes, national advertising
campaigns, or winter months14 . With the inclusion of trendt, the model has a very flexible
functional form.
However, as we are also interested in the time-invariant Competition variable, we also
consider an additional model without store specific effects and include store-level variables with
demographic data included in our regression. Specifically, the alternative estimating equation
14Including a more flexible form that allows for differing district level shocks by including the interaction term
for district and month dummies, or states and month dummies results in very similar estimates.
for the bottom level is:
I
Sint = districtin + Bi - log(YGnt/PGnt) +j- T3ij " log(Pint) +
j=1
r7i -Competitionn +0 -Xn + wt + trendt + vint
The equation is the same as before, but replaces the store-product fixed effect with district
level fixed effects districtin, includes the variable Competitionn, and store level demographics
Xn. The store-level demographics in our data set Xn, control for store-level heterogeneity.
With district dummies, we are observing the across-store, but within-district, correlation of the
variable Competitionn with product shares. It is of interest to see the correlation with both
store brand and national brand shares.
For the top level, each segment m has an estimating equation:
log(qmnt) = amn + Bm log(YBnt) + 6mi - log(Hlnt)
+6Jm2 log(Hl2nt) + 6,m3 log(fl3nt) +
6m4" log(H4nt) + wt + trendt + Emnt
where m denotes segment, n denotes store, and t denotes time. The left hand side qmnt is
defined to be YGnt/PGnt from the bottom level. The left hand side variables are YBnt, overall
expenditure on all pain killers, HIlnt, I12nt, H3nt, and II4nt, price indices for each of the 4
segments (PGnt in the bottom share equation). Other right hand side variables include trendt,
a time trend, amn, city-specific fixed effects and wt, month-year dummies.
We now discuss calculation of both conditional and unconditional elasticities. From just
the bottom level estimates from a particular segment, we are able to calculate conditional
elasticities. Differentiating holding YGnt constant, and using the Stone weighted price index,
the conditional elasticities are defined by:
own:
dln(qmi) 1 i dln(Pm) +
d ln(pmi) smi d n(Pmi) mii
cross:
dln(qmi) _ 1 dln(Pm) +m
dln(Pmj) Smi Idln(Pmj) mi
Using estimates from both top and bottom level equations, we can calculate "unconditional"
elasticities, or elasticities conditional on total expenditure on pain relievers. Substituting the
top-level equation into the bottom-level equation for log(qmnt) = YGnt/PGnt and differentiating,
the unconditional elasticity estimates are:
own:
dln(qmi) 
_ 1 Bm dln(Pm) 1
dln(Pmi) smi -Bmi- dln(Pmi) + Ymii - 1 + Smi + 6mm mi
cross within segment:
dln(qmi) _ 1 dBmi m ln(Pm) +'Ymij + mj + 6m mj
d ln(pmj) smi m d mm  n(Pi)
cross out of segment:
dln(qmi)= Bmi mn d In(Pn) +mn Sn
d ln(Pnj) Smi m dln(Pnj)
1.4 Estimation and results
1.4.1 Identification and Instruments
In general, prices will be correlated with the error term as firms adjust prices to demand
shocks unobserved to the econometrician. However in our setting, it might be reasonable
to assume that prices are predetermined with respect to the estimating equation. Upper
management indicated that they set their prices in advance to prepare shelf stickers and other
promotional material for their stores. This is consistent with the centralized district pricing
structure of the retail chain and also the price rigidity we observe in our data. Also, if price
promotions are caused by supply reasons, i.e., supply shifting factors like a change in input
prices or shocks to inventory levels, then the price variation will not be correlated with the
error term in the demand equation. Thus, if we assumed predetermined prices with respect to
the estimating equation, we could run ordinary least squares and identify the parameters.
If prices are correlated with demand shocks, then they can be classified into roughly three
levels. At the very local or city level, shocks in a particular city do not seem to be affecting price
promotions because the retailer prices multiple stores that are in the same district identically.
We might be more concerned about these shocks if store managers were given control over the
pricing in their own stores because then they could adjust prices to local demand shocks. At
the regional level, management at the retailer may take these shocks into account when setting
prices, and national brand manufacturers might time their promotions in advance to coincide
with periods of low demand in certain regions, or vary the promotion depth by region which
would violate the exogeneity assumption.
To deal with potentially endogenous prices, the panel structure of the data is utilized to
provide instruments. For stores located in the Midwest region, prices from a store in the
Mid-Atlantic and a store in the Deep-South are used as instruments. Likewise, for stores
located in the Mid-Atlantic, we use instruments from a store in the Midwest and from a store
in the Deep-South. Similar instruments are used for stores located in the Deep-South. We
chose instruments from these regions because the retailer seems to divide its pricing in this
way, and also because we wanted to choose instruments from geographically the farthest areas
to prevent regional shocks from spilling over into our instruments. For example, a regional
demand shock in Illinois might also affect a store in Indiana, but is less likely to spillover into
the Mid-Atlantic or Deep-South areas. If we used prices from a store in Indiana as instruments
for a store in Illinois, then the instruments would still be correlated with the regional demand
shock in the error term and would no longer be a valid instrument. Thus, we hope to use the
most parsimonious instruments available to us instead of using a larger, but more suspect set
of instruments. The instruments from the Mid-Atlantic and the Deep-South regions, will be
correlated with prices in the Midwest because of cost shocks, but will be uncorrelated with the
regional demand shocks in the Midwest. So for each store, only two other stores in different
geographic regions are used, so that each price will have two instruments15
A major criticism of this type of instrument is that it does not take into account national
demand shocks that affect all stores. For example, a national advertising campaign, or the
winter months where all stores are affected might be a large concern. However, we specifically
include month-year dummies and a time trend to control for these types of national demand
shocks. In sum, prices may be predetermined in our estimating equation because they are
fixed by the retailer in advance, and if they do not adjust to local and regional demand shocks.
However, this assumption will be violated if national brand manufacturers time their promotions
to regional demand shocks. The next section will investigate this by comparing OLS and 2SLS
results.
1.4.2 Bottom Level
OLS and 2SLS results
Now we present estimates from different econometric methods for the bottom level equation
in Table 2 for every segment. For the segment acetaminophen, the national brand Tylenol
estimates are presented on the left side and the PL estimates are reported for completeness16 .
Each brand has an estimating equation with product share as the dependent variable. Column
(1) labeled OLS-FE, includes store fixed effects and does not use instruments; column (2)
labeled 2SLS-FE uses store fixed effects and price instruments from other regions; column (3)
labeled 2SLS-DST uses district fixed effects, and reports only the coefficients on the time-
varying variables as a comparison and leaves discussion of the time-invariant demographic
variables that are included in this regression until the next subsection. Standard errors are
calculated using the Newey-West method with eight lags to account for both hetereoskedasticity
and autocorrelation within a store.
Note first that the OLS regressions have qualitatively sensible estimates with all price co-
15We chose a "representative" store from each region essentially at random, where this store's prices were used
as instruments for the other regions. We did ensure that the representative store we chose was geographically far
away from the other stores for which it would serve as an instrument. For example, we would not choose a store
in say VA to represent the Deep-South since it is geographically close to the stores located in the Mid-Atlantic
regions.
"1Recall that there are only two brands in this segment and since shares must add up to one, the PL label
estimates are redundant.
efficients having the expected sign, as own price coefficients are negative while cross price
coefficients are positive. In other words, a decrease in the price of Tylenol increases the share
of Tylenol, while a price decrease in PL decreases Tylenol share. For Tylenol, the own price
coefficient on the least squares model is -0.457 and the cross price coefficient is 0.261. In addi-
tion, comparing the estimated price parameters from columns (1) and (2), the OLS estimates
are similar in magnitude to the estimates using instruments where the own price coefficient for
Tylenol changes from -0.457 to -0.572 and the cross price coefficient changes from 0.261 to 0313.
The increase in magnitude in the own price coefficients with the use of instruments implies that
prices are positively correlated with demand shocks, i.e., a negative shock in the error term
induces a decrease in price.
For the segment naproxen, OLS regression coefficients are also sensible and similar in mag-
nitude to the regressions using instruments. In column (1) for national brand Aleve, the own
price coefficient is -0.441 and the cross price coefficient is positive at 0.390. As before, the mag-
nitudes from the OLS and 2SLS results are similar when comparing column (1) and column
(2), while 2SLS coefficients are larger in magnitude. We find that for all four segments, the
OLS results have the expected sign, and are somewhat close to magnitude to the 2SLS results.
Therefore, we conclude from this that the retailer does set prices in advance, but as the up-
stream manufacturers (and the retailer) can target their promotions to regional demand shocks
and perhaps do so, the use of instruments from other regions is a more valid approach. For
the remainder of the paper, we report all estimates using instruments, although qualitatively
all of our main results are the same if we use the OLS-FE specification.
Column (3) reports the results only for the time-varying coefficients, when using district-
product fixed effects and instruments. Due to the district pricing structure of the retail chain,
there is a interesting interpretation to this specification. As prices within a district are the
same, the within district variation of prices is the same as the within store variation of prices.
All identification of the regression with district dummies is coming from promotions within
stores, instead of variation of prices across stores, since there is no variation in prices across
stores that are in the same district. Thus, it is not surprising that the price coefficients from
both specifications are very similar. For example, the own price coefficient for Tylenol changes
marginally from -0.572 to -0.582 and the cross price coefficient changes from 0.313 to 0.310
(Table 2, column (2) and (3)). Again, this result holds for all four segments. The main
interest of this specification using district fixed effects will be on the time-invariant variables,
where we investigate how competition is correlated with the store and national brand shares.
Competition
The nature of horizontal competition for national and PL brands is intrinsically different,
as customers can find national brands anywhere, but PL brands only in one particular retailer.
Taking advantage of the store-level demographics in our data set, we aim to gain insight on
this issue by observing how the number of competitors in a local area is correlated with the
shares of national and private label brands. As the number of competitors in a region will
depend on many factors, we do not claim to identify a causal effect on demand. However,
we attempt to at least partially control for some demand shifting factors with other store-
level demographics, and the inclusion of a district-brand fixed effect. With the district fixed
effect, we are observing the correlation of Competition with product shares from across store
but within district variation. Implicitly, we are assuming that stores within a district, or the
customers that shop at these stores, are more comparable than say stores or customers within a
state17. For example, another alternative would be to use within state variation of stores, but
then we might be comparing a store located in a small town to a store in a densely populated
capital city. Our view is that the within district comparison of stores is a better one.
Now turning to Table 3, we focus on the Competition variable, the number of direct com-
petitors in a 2 mile radius of the store, which is boldfaced for emphasis. These parameters
are from the 2SLS-DST specification in Table 2, using instruments and district dummies. The
other variables are the time-invariant store-level demographics that are included as controls,
and an additional control we calculate is Shelf, or a measure of shelf space calculated for each
store and brand (see Table 1.0 for definition). Note first the striking pattern of the coefficients
where all PL brands have positive coefficients on competition and the most salient brands like
Tylenol, Bayer, Advil, Motrin, and Aleve, which are universally available at all local retailers,
have negative Competition coefficients. The one exception is the lesser known national brand
Ecotrin which has a positive coefficient but is the smallest in magnitude and insignificant. For
17Some districts span more than one state.
example, in column (3), Bayer aspirin has a negative and significant Competition coefficient
of -0.08. This implies that a retail store with 5 more competing stores in a local 2 mile radius
will see a decrease in average share of Bayer by roughly 4%. For PL brand ibuprofen (column
(8)), 5 more competing stores implies an increase of PL share by 3.5%.
One explanation for this pattern is that consumers can find PL brand products only in one
retailer, and not in any competing retailer, while national brands are available anywhere. For
example, consider an area which has a relatively large number of retailers selling Tylenol. A
consumer who has a headache in this area has a lot more locations in which to purchase Tylenol,
and will more likely end up buying Tylenol at some other retailer than the retailer in our data
set. On the other hand, a consumer who lives in an area with only our retailer, will end up
going to our retail store to purchase Tylenol. Although the rest of the paper will be focused on
brand competition within a store, this results pertains to a different dimension of competition;
namely, that PL products can affect how retailers compete with each other.
However, one could offer other explanations that might explain this pattern of correlations.
An alternative explanation might be that a higher number of competitors in a local radius is
associated with a lower price of Tylenol in the surrounding area, for which we unfortunately do
not have price data to include into our specification. For example, if competitors have lower
prices on Tylenol, then a customer can purchase Tylenol cheaply elsewhere, and will induce the
correlation we see in our data. To some extent, our demographics and district dummies will
control for this, but more data would be needed to address this issue. What we do find is that
the average customer walking into a retail store in areas with more local competitors will spend
a larger fraction of his budget on PL brands, and consequently, a lower fraction of his budget
on national brands. This is the most interesting finding to us that the correlations between
Competition and PL and national brands shares follow this distinct pattern, and speaks to the
unique availability of store brands.
Conditional Elasticities
Now we use only the specification 2SLS-FE, which uses instruments and store fixed effects
for the rest of the paper to examine brand competition within a store. From the bottom
level estimates only, we compute the conditional elasticities and they are presented in Table 4.
These elasticities are conditional on overall expenditure within a segment, and as a result, are
not defined for products outside the segment. One can interpret these estimates as measuring
how consumers respond to prices of national and PL brand products, once the consumer has
decided to buy a particular analgesic segment.
For all segments, there are substantial negative own price conditional elasticities indicating
that consumers respond heavily to prices conditional on segment choice (see estimates along
the diagonal). For example, in the segment acetaminophen, the own price elasticities are -1.74
for Tylenol and -2.53 for the PL brand and for the segment aspirin, the own elasticities are
-3.48 and -1.44 for Bayer and PL brand respectively. Standard errors are calculated using the
delta method, and elasticities are evaluated at the mean value of the revenue share.
To complete the picture, there are also quite large cross price elasticities which imply that
consumers substitute between different brands within a segment. Notice that the cross elasticity
of Bayer quantity with respect to the price of PL is fairly small at 0.28, but we observe much
larger cross elasticities of around 1.25 for PL quantity with respect to the price of Tylenol. This
implies that a price change by Bayer has a large effect on the sales of the PL brand, while a price
change of the PL has little effect on the sales of the national brand. For the segment aspirin
where the share of the PL brand is the highest at 50%, these conditional elasticities support the
asymmetric switching result. The segment ibuprofen, which also has a relatively high PL share
has cross elasticities that exhibit asymmetric switching. There are clearly asymmetries in the
conditional elasticities, even for segments where PL share is high. To characterize the overall
response to prices, we now turn to estimating the top level which examines how consumers
substitute between different segments based on the average prices of those segments.
1.4.3 Top Level Estimates
Now we present the top level estimates in Table 5 for all four segments, where a column
represents one estimating equation. We use Stone weighted price indexes to calculate prices for
each segment, and use similar instruments for prices. The dependent variable is log quantity
and there is one top level equation for each segment. The top level estimates describe how
consumers substitute between different segments based on the average prices of those segments.
For example, in column (1), the own price coefficient is -2.3, which can be interpreted as an
elasticity of acetaminophen drugs with respect to the average price of acetaminophen drugs.
Although some cross segment elasticities are negative for acetaminophen, they are insignificant
and small. The cross segment elasticity of acetaminophen with respect to naproxen is fairly
large, at 1.02 and significant.
For naproxen, (column (4)), the own price elasticity is the largest at -4.80, which indicates
the naproxen segment responds heavily to price. The cross elasticities are also very large, so
that consumers substitute easily in and out of the naproxen segment. Overall, the estimates
are reasonable, with all negative own segment elasticities and mostly positive cross segment
elasticities where they are significant, except for the cross price elasticity of aspirin with respect
to acetaminophen (column (2)). We conclude from the large cross segment estimates that con-
sumers substitute heavily between different types of analgesics. Now that we understand how
consumers substitute across different segments from the top level results, and how consumers
respond to prices conditional on choice of some segment from the bottom level, we can describe
overall consumer response to prices.
1.4.4 Unconditional Elasticities
Issues
Combining these top level and bottom level estimates, we obtain the "unconditional" elas-
ticity estimates and use the delta method to compute standard errors. These estimates are still
conditional on the overall expenditure in the analgesics product category, which we believe is
a valid assumption for our product. A violation of this assumption would be that a change
in the average price of analgesics would affect the amount consumers spend on analgesic pain
relievers by substituting towards an outside good. One typically thinks demand for pain reliev-
ers as fairly inelastic at the category level, and that it is difficult to think of consumers finding
alternative products for pain relief.
We address one more issue before presenting our results. First, some readers may ask how
much of the elasticity estimates reflect stockpiling behavior. Although we cannot completely
rule out stockpiling, there is less concern for the analgesics product category because the poten-
tial savings that a consumer can gain from stockpiling are so low. For example, if a consumer
times his purchase during a promotion where a large $8 bottle of pills is discounted by 50%,
then at most the consumer will save $4 over the months or maybe years in which he consumes
the pills. We might be more concerned for product categories where stockpiling results in much
larger savings per month for a household, say for example soda, which might be consumed on
a daily basis and stockpiling can result in significant savings over normal retail prices. Second,
we do not think of pain killers as a product that consumers purchase multiple bottles when
there is a sale. One bottle of pills might be enough for a household to consume for a year
or two, and purchasing an additional bottle might not be used at all before the expiration
date. Finally, our estimates show that most of the cross elasticities are large and significant,
which implies that much of the own price elasticity is capturing brand switching effects. As
we observe very large own elasticities in conjunction with large cross elasticities, our estimates
are primarily capturing substitution.
Own Price Elasticities
Table 6 presents the estimates of the unconditional elasticity estimates, and the block
diagonal shading indicates within segment elasticities. Along the diagonal are the own price
elasticities and they range in magnitude from 2 to 5 and are of the expected sign. As a com-
parison, the one other study that calculates elasticities for analgesics find own price elasticities
of -2.7, -3.0, -2.25, -2.6, and -1.8 for Tylenol, Advil, Bayer, Motrin, and a PL version of aspirin
(Chintagunta 2002). Although it is hard to compare the results, as they use a multinomial
logit model and their products are individual SKUs while ours are aggregated product brands,
the elasticities from our model are -2.8, -3.2, -3.85, -3.83, and -1.95 respectively, which are quite
similar. The one commonality between these two data sets is that they observe consumers
at one retail chain store at a disaggregated store-week level, instead of data that covers larger
regions at a more aggregated level.
The national branded products in our category have higher own price elasticities than the PL
brand, which might mistakenly be interpreted as customers purchasing these national brands as
being more price sensitive than customers purchasing the PL brand. The own price elasticities
are measuring how much quantity increases when national brands run price promotions. Thus,
a larger own elasticity of national brands implies that sales respond more to a price decrease
than the PL brand products. We shall see that the sales increase is coming from customers
substituting both from different segments and from the store brand products from the large
cross elasticities in the next two sections. The large own elasticities then, are in some sense
capturing how much consumers switch to that brand when there is price decrease. In other
words, a price drop by a PL brand does not increase its demand because no customers substitute
towards it, while a price drop by a national brand will see a substantial increase in demand as
consumers switch to those brands.
Cross Price Elasticities- Within Segment
Focusing on the shaded regions of Table 6, or within segment estimates, all cross price
elasticities are positive when significant. First, notice that the elasticity of the PL brand with
respect to the national brand price is large in magnitude for all segments, and these estimates
are generally located in the upper right hand regions of the shaded block diagonal. For example,
in the ibuprofen segment, the elasticity of the PL brand with respect to the price of Advil is
1.49, while in the naproxen segment, the elasticity of the PL brand with respect to the price of
Aleve is 2.23. For all segments, a price change by the national brand elicits a large response
from the PL brand when observing cross elasticities. There are only two cross elasticities in
the aspirin segment that are of the wrong sign and insignificant. They are also very small in
magnitude, both less than 0.3.
Observing the elasticities of the national brands with respect to the price of the PL brands,
which are located generally in the lower left hand regions of the shaded areas of Table 6 shows
that the cross elasticities are very low, or that there is a pattern of asymmetric switching. The
cross price elasticity of Bayer with respect to the PL brand aspirin is actually negative and
insignificant at -0.3, and for Ecotrin, it is also negative at -0.04. This is essentially saying that
a price promotion by the PL branded aspirin does not reduce quantity for the national brands
at all. Furthermore, recall that the market share of PL aspirin is the highest at 50%, and these
elasticity estimates are not "biased" in terms of favoring asymmetric switching. The bias is
actually in the opposite direction, and regardless of what measure we might use, asymmetric
switching is present. This is also true for the segment ibuprofen, where PL share is also
relatively high as compared to the national brand, and there is clear asymmetry in the way
consumers switch between PL and national brand products. For example, the cross elasticity
of Advil with respect to the price of PL brand ibuprofen is only 0.18 while the reverse elasticity
is 1.49. We conclude that there are clear asymmetries in the patterns of substitution between
national and private label products in the unconditional elasticities as well.
Cross Elasticities- Across Segments
Between products in different segments, or in the non-shaded area of Table 6, there are
large and significant cross elasticities. For example, the cross elasticity of Advil with respect
to the price of Tylenol is fairly high at 0.89 and significant, and contributes to the large own
elasticity observed for the national brand Tylenol of -2.82. Looking across the first row in
Table 6, there are many other large significant positive cross elasticities that further contribute
to the large magnitude of the own price elasticity18 . All products have very significant cross
elasticities for products out of their own segments. Examining the elasticity of Advil with
respect to the price of Aleve, the cross elasticity is 1.22. Overall, we conclude that there is
much substitution between products in different segments, which is in contrast to previous work
on demand estimation of drugs in the pharmaceutical industry.
One reason that pharmaceutical drugs may have very small cross elasticities for products in
different segments is perhaps due to the prescription writing phase, where the doctor confines
a patient to purchase a certain chemical type of drug. As doctors are not paying for the prices
out of their pocket, and they might be ill-informed about relative prices of the various drugs,
this could cause cross segment elasticities to be low. However, within a chemical type, the
patient has more control over whether she wants to buy a generic or branded version of the
drug. The similarities between our drugs and the cephalosphorins studied by Ellison et al.
(1997) are many. One, both have generic and branded counterparts, and both are regulated
by the FDA in the United States. Two, all of the their anti-infective drugs treat somewhat
similar conditions, but are chemically different, which is similar to our OTC pain relievers. One
substantive difference that could affect cross elasticities is that consumers do not need to have a
physician's prescription for our products and are free to choose any of the four chemical types.
18 Almost all out of segment elasticities are of the expected sign, except for the elasticity of any aspirin product
with respect to the price of any acetaminophen product. This can be explained by re-examining the top level
estimates in Table 5, and noticing that for the segment aspirin, the coefficient on In-IfAcetaminophen is negative
and of the wrong sign, and will generally pervade the whole block.
For example, if naproxen is on sale relative to the other segments, consumers can substitute into
the naproxen segment to take advantage of the sale. Thus, in our scenario where consumers
are free to choose the chemical type to treat their condition, it turns out that cross elasticites
are large and significant.
1.5 Conclusion
One demand side feature of these PL brands is that price discounts do not have much
effect on national brand sales, but price promotions by national brands steal a lot of demand
from store brands. In other words, we find evidence of asymmetric switching in the analgesics
product category. An important implication of this finding is that PL brands might go on sale
less often than national brands.
Furthermore, another demand side feature unique to a retailer's PL brand is that they
cannot be found at other retailers. We find that the number of local competitors affects the
PL and national brand demands differently. One potentially explanation is that consumers
who want to purchase national brand products can do so more easily when more competitors
are in the local area. This is an interesting empirical finding that reflects the distinct nature
of national and PL products, and further research might shed light as to what might be driving
this pattern. Finally, we find consumers substitute heavily between different types of chemical
for analgesics which contrasts with previous work on pharmaceutical drugs, which may be due
to the multiple agents for prescription drugs.
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Table 1.1 - Brand Summary Statistics and Revenue Share
Segmel Brand
Acetarr Tylenol
PL
Bayer
Aspirin Ecotrin
PL
Advil
Ibuprof Motrin
PL
AleveNaprox
PL
% Product Brand Segment
#of SKUs Revenue Share Share Share
11 80% 80% 77% 35%16 69% 20% 23%
4 69% 32% 27%
1 67% 18% 34% 14%
6 65% 50% 39%
9 91% 54% 47%
4 50% 12% 18% 33%
6 76% 33% 35%
3 77% 85% 90%
18%3 84% 15% 10%
Table 1.2 - Summary Statistics Store Level Characteristics
Variable II Mean Stddev
Competition 1.30 1.90
OwnStores 0.450 0.970
PopDensity 1743 1762
MedianInc 35769 11499
AvgAge 38.17 3.06
N = 111 stores or observations
Table 1.3 - Correlation Coefficients of Store-level Variables
Competition
OwnStores
PopDensity
MedianInc
AvgAge
IlCompetition OwnStores
0.297
N = 111 stores or observations
PopDensity
0.729
0.561
MedianInc
-0.148
-0.119
-0.115
AvgAge
-0.259
-0.187
-0.424
-0.004
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Chapter 2
Consumer Stockpiling Behavior
2.1 Introduction
When consumers visit their local supermarket or pharmacy in any given week, they undoubtedly
encounter temporary price reductions in the form of a sale. While a lower price today may
induce an increase in actual consumption of that product, rational agents that foresee higher
future prices might stockpile additional product to lock in the temporary drop in prices. To
further clarify the distinction between the two effects, consider the following example. Suppose
a shopper consumes one can of soda everyday irrespective of the price. Her consumption effect
for a price decrease is zero because she always consumes only one can of soda per day. Yet,
when we observe her purchases over time we would likely find that her purchases during a sale
are higher, because she has dynamic incentives to purchase more when prices are lower and
store the cans, so long as her storage costs are not prohibitively high. In this example, the
increase in quantity that we observe from a sale is solely a stockpiling effect. Thus, in general,
the resulting increase in quantity we observe from a price promotion potentially conflates both
a consumption and a stockpiling effect.
Stockpiling behavior has recently received considerable interest because of the implication it
has for demand estimation, a workhorse for much of empirical analysis in industrial organization.
For many nondurable products, product prices stay relatively constant at some regular or modal
price, and then go on sale temporarily for say a week. This short lived price promotion is
both a boon and a bane for economists interested in demand estimation. On the one hand it
provides the necessary price variation to identify price elasticities. However, standard demand
estimation only identifies the short run response to a change in prices which may include
both stockpiling and consumption effects. For most demand applications, the long-run or
consumption response to prices are of interest. Thus it is important to differentiate between
consumption and stockpiling effects.
This paper seeks to empirically investigate the presence of stockpiling as well as estimate
the long-run consumption response to prices. There are at least two features of our data set
that aid our analysis. First, our key findings come from very disaggregated individual-level data
that typically is unavailable to most researchers'. With individual-level data, we can control
for unobserved individual level traits to remove this bias. When one uses store-level data,
it is impossible to determine whether individuals who purchase during a sale are inherently
different than individuals who shop during nonsale periods. This could induce a selection bias
on the estimated impact of price on quantity, unbeknownst to the econometrician. Furthermore,
with individual-level data, it now becomes possible to investigate implications at the heart of
stockpiling. For example, we can examine if a person who purchases during a sale delays his
next purchase, which is untestable with more aggregate data.
Even with the presence of individual-level data however, since historical data usually consists
of short-term sales that may create incentives for stockpiling, this prohibits the estimation of
the consumption effects without additional assumptions. Thus, we take a more direct approach
by utilizing the presence of a field experiment in our data, where in some stores the price level
drops for the duration of our data, which is about one year after the experiment. The nature
of the field experiment is particularly apt for measuring consumption effects because the price
change is long term in nature, and not of the short term variety that would induce stockpiling
behavior. We have a panel of stores where a subset of them (test stores) experience the long
term decrease in price. The stores not involved in the manipulation serve as control stores, and
allow us to estimate the consumption effect with a differences-in-differences estimator.
One of the drawbacks of our data set is that it comes from just one retailer, which represents
1Hendel and Nevo(2002) also use individual-level data, and the first portion of our empirical analysis is similar
to their work. The presence of a field experiment in our data is the major difference between the two papers.
only a portion of the consumer's shopping activity. This has at least two implications for our
work. First, if consumers stockpile elsewhere and do less stockpiling in our retailer, our results
will not detect consumer inventory behavior even if it is occurring at other outlets. We have
reason to believe that this may be true, as our retailer offers convenience with many locations
in a given geographic area, but at higher prices than other retailers. Consumers may buy only
what they need at that moment, and stockpile at cheaper outlets. Second, having only a slice
of data implies that any measured impact of price on quantity could be attributable to outlet
substitution. The example we have in mind is the permanent price decrease from the field
experiment, which may cause shoppers to shift their purchases into our stores. This will tend
to overestimate the increase in quantity due to the manipulation 2
We return our attention to the selection bias when one uses store-level data to measure the
impact of a price change on quantity. To isolate this bias, we momentarily assume that all
individuals do not stockpile and that the consumption effect is constant across all individuals.
More specifically, assume that for a 10% sale off regular price, all individuals consume 20%
more quantity leading to a consumption elasticity of -2, which is the true elasticity we want to
measure. The selection bias relies on the assumption that individuals who purchase more of
their basket on sale, also known as deal-prone individuals, purchase a higher level of quantity
when compared to non-deal-prone individuals. This assumption might be satisfied when those
individuals that are responsible for purchasing all of the goods for a large household buy more
quantity because they shop for the whole family. They may also buy more of their basket on sale
for two reasons. One, if they are not the primary income source for the household, then they
could have a lower opportunity cost of time and be more willing to search for a sale. Two, they
may benefit more from finding a sale as compared to households with fewer individuals because
they save margin over more units 3. Now if we look at a sale period, the shoppers will more likely
be of the deal-prone type, who also happen to purchase more quantity by assumption. Since
they purchase much more quantity, the data at the store level will reveal an elasticity larger in
magnitude than 2 because of this selection. This result is relatively important as much recent
research has been conducted using store-level data. We find that this bias in elasticities can be
2If we had data from other retailers, we could easily address both issues.
3 While we only conjecture as to why this assumption might be true, it is reassuring that it is empirically
satisfied in our data as well as in the data of Hendel and Nevo (2002).
very large, in the range of 30% to 50% for our product categories. Most likely, the dearth of
individual level data has obscured this bias, because it exists when individuals who purchase
on sale also purchase a higher level quantity, a statement not testable with store-level data.
We analyze the product categories mouthwash, disposable diapers, and individually wrapped
chocolate bars. We chose these product categories for a number of reasons. First, the price
promotions for these product categories are short lived, which create incentives for consumers
to time their purchases during sales. Second, a priori we believe there is variation in the rela-
tive consumption and stockpiling effects across the different product categories. For example,
households that consists of one or more infants might stockpile a lot of diapers when they are
on sale, because they are very nonperishable and relatively expensive. On the other hand,
diapers are large and bulky, and if storage space is limited then this may temper stockpiling
motives. As for consumption motives, one might think that actual consumption of diapers for
a household does not respond to price because a parent changes diapers as needed. Chocolate
bars on the other hand, might be an item that you don't typically stockpile because they are
somewhat perishable although they are small in size. Mouthwash is extremely nonperishable
and also small in size. The third and practical reason for choosing these product categories is
that they have quantity information which was unavailable for many other product categories.
We borrow heavily from the consumer inventory model in Hendel and Nevo (2002) and the
predictions that result from it. In their theoretical model, a forward-looking utility maximizing
consumer who faces uncertain future prices has choice over consumption and purchases in each
period. They show that optimal behavior depends on a trigger and target level of inventory. For
example, when inventory is low enough or at the trigger level, a consumer will purchase quantity
to replenish his stock to its target level. The trigger and target levels are naturally decreasing
functions of price. In other words, during a sale consumers purchase even if their stockpiles at
home are relatively high and will also generally stockpile to a higher level of inventory. During
a nonsale, the trigger level is lower which accords with the idea that at high prices you might
purchase only for immediate consumption.
To test some of the implications of stockpiling we use both individual and aggregate store
level data. Using aggregate data, our evidence is mixed on the stockpiling issue. The consumer
inventory model predicts that duration from previous sale has a positive effect on the aggregate
quantity sold in both sale and nonsale periods. As time passes since the previous sale, each
person's inventory at home decreases on average. While our results support this for sale periods,
we find no support for the hypothesis during nonsale periods. Next, using individual level data
we attempt to compute the bias associated with stockpiling as well as the aforementioned bias
that results from more deal prone individuals purchasing during a sale. Finally, using the data
from the field experiment we find that for both mouthwash and chocolate, these products exhibit
no increase in quantity from the resulting price decrease, i.e., no consumption effect. However,
there is an unexpected 12% increase in quantity for diapers. While this seems counterintuitive
as one would expect the consumption effect for diapers to be very small, there is evidence that
consumers are shifting the diaper purchases they made at other retailers (which we do not
observe) into our data set. Perhaps this is not surprising given the amount of money a shopper
can save on diapers relative to either the mouthwash or chocolate product categories.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the field experiment. In section
3, we describe the data while in section 4 we present the model for the field experiment data.
In section 5, we present the results and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Field Experiment- Overview
This section provides a more detailed description of the field experiment, where we first
review our basic estimation strategy. Recall, our main findings come from a natural field
experiment where prices were reduced in a set of test stores to a lower level indefinitely. The
basic idea is to estimate the effect of the price decrease on quantity purchased from the field
experiment using a differences-in-differences estimator which we present in section 4. The
exogenous variation in prices rules out the possibility that prices are responding to local demand
conditions, and allows us to assign causation to the increase in quantity. Even if test stores are
systematically different than the control stores, since we control for individual fixed effects and
hence store fixed effects, this should not affect the results4 . For example, if the test stores are
located in areas with more intense competition and this factor does not change over time, our
fixed effects will account for this.
4Since individual fixed effects are a proper subset of store fixed effects.
Logistically, all of the test stores experienced the same decrease in prices although across
products, the manipulation varied. For example, for our three product categories mouthwash,
diapers, and chocolate, the average price decline is 14%, 5%, and 15% respectively5 . Some may
be concerned about substitution across different products as relative prices change in the test
stores in the post test period and how this might affect the change in quantity we measure.
However, since our analysis is at the category level as opposed to the product level we are less
concerned about this. For example, it is hard to think of other product categories that might
be close substitutes for diapers, mouthwash, or chocolate bars.
Short-term price promotions exist in both test and control stores throughout the data.
For example, previous to the manipulation, both test and control stores ran temporary price
promotions about 23% of the time6 . After the manipulation, price promotions for control stores
occur 22% of the time and 19% of the time for test stores. This is reassuring that there still exist
price promotions and at roughly the same frequency as the control stores because otherwise,
those consumers who search for sales might shift their purchases elsewhere and this would bias
our results downwards into showing that the consumption effects are small. Essentially, the
benefit shoppers receive from taking advantage of promotions in the test stores is still the same
as the control stores.
From the consumer's perspective, it is important that they believe the decrease in prices is
not a temporary one, because then consumers might stockpile during this period. Consumers
were notified of this change in at least two ways. Customers were sent out mail pieces that
notified them with messages like "new lower prices everyday" and banners were placed in
and around the store indicating the same. Also, "was/now" signs were placed on those items
that had new lower prices to distinguish them from other signs that indicated a temporary
sale. Finally, the actual experience of customers matches the claims made on these banners as
seen by the consistent low price level throughout the approximate one-year of data after the
experiment.
5This was calculated by first aggregating across products using revenue share weighted prices and regressing
this on a dummy for test stores, a dummy indicating post test period, and the interaction between these two
dummies. Using quantity weightings of the prices and including various other controls like seasonal month
dummies do not affect the magnitudes.
6We define a price promotion as a price at least 5% below regular shelf price.
2.3 Data
Our data set is from a national chain retailer that sells consumer package goods. The
first data set consists of scanner data where for every SKU(Stock Keeping Unit) we observe
regular price, paid price, and quantities sold at the store week level7 . The 111 stores for which
we have data are located in the Midwest, South, and the mid-Atlantic regions of the US. The
data runs from January 2003 until October 2004, right before the start of the field experiment.
The second data set consists of a panel of over 4000 individuals where we have very detailed
information. We observe what SKU they purchased, how much they paid, which store they
visited, and the date of purchase. It contains 12 months of data before the field experiment,
and 11 months of data after the field experiment.
The three product categories we study are mouthwash, diapers, and chocolate. The mouth-
wash product category consists of Listerine, Scope, and the store brand version where the
common sizes are 250, 500, and 1000 milliliters. For diapers the name brands are Huggies,
Pampers, as well as the store brand and coming in a variety of sizes ranging from 21 up to 56
count. Finally, for chocolate bars some of the brands are Milky Way, Hershey's, and Reese's
and I define regular size candy bars having unit size while king-size candy bars are defined to
be 30% larger.
A major shortcoming of our data is that we only observe prices when there is a purchase,
so there is little price information about products that are purchased infrequently. Thus we
aggregate in various ways to construct derivative data. First, we take advantage of the retailers
pricing structure. Like many other large retailers, pricing decisions are made by upper man-
agement at headquarters so that stores clustered in a localized geographic region or a district
will have the same prices8 . Thus we aggregate over the stores within a district. Second, we
choose those products that have price information in at least 90% of the weeks in our data,
which accounts for 74% of total sales in these three product categories. We might be somewhat
concerned about limiting our attention to certain SKUs if each district had different product
offerings to cater to local tastes. However, all of the products under study are available at all
7Regular price is the shelf price in the store and does not include promotions. For example, if product X is
normally $5.99 but is on promotion for that week at $4.99, then the regular price is equal to $5.99, and the paid
price is $4.99.
8 See Cho (2007) for details.
the stores and sell very well in both the pre and the post test periods. Any remaining missing
prices are inserted with price information from neighboring weeks for that district. From here
on, we refer to the aggregate district as a store.
For the individual level data set, we deal with the sparseness of the data by aggregating
over time when needed and will select individuals that purchase more quantity for the field
experiment regressions, as there are many individuals that come into our stores and purchase
only a couple times a year. We restrict our attention to these individuals because they are
more likely to be aware of the price decrease occurring in the test store. Also since we include
individual fixed effects for our main results we capture within response of quantity with respect
to the price change for these customers. We point out the consumers that were selected and on
what criterion when presenting the results.
2.4 Field Experiment- Empirical Model
In this section, we present the econometric model that will be applied to the field experi-
ment data for clarity (Tables 5 and 6) 9. Recall that we want to measure the consumption effect
due to a long term decrease in price by running a difference-in-difference estimator where stores
are classified as either test or control. As both test and control stores are spread across many
different states, we want to have control stores in say Illinois to serve as a control for test stores
in Illinois.
Indexing i for individual, t for time, the model is:
Qit = ai + Statel[1 l -postt + - -postt * testi] + State2 [2 postt+ 72 postt * test] + ...
+State5[/ 5 " postt + _5 -postt * testi] + season1 + season2 + season3
where Stater, .., States indexes state dummies, postt indicates the time periods after the
manipulation, and testi denotes whether or not the individual shops at a test store. We also
include seasonal dummies labeled season1, ..., season3 . For each state notice that the above
specification would be performing a differences in differences estimator, controlling for seasonal
9 The models used for Tables 1 - 4 will be discussed in the text as we present the results in the next section.
effects. Control stores and test stores in Illinois will identify a 81 and yl just for Illinois, while
Indiana will identify its own 02 and 72. As we are less interested in looking at how the response
to the experiment varies by state, we impose the following constraint:
'1 = 12 = .. -ý5 -
This yields the following model:
Qit = i + 1 -postt * State + ... +...  postt * State5 + y postt * testi
+seasoni + season2 + season3
y is the variable of interest, and is our direct measure of the consumption effect from the
experiment. The State dummies interacted with post dummy allow for test stores in different
states to have stores within the same state to serve as controls. This specification is more
robust than using all non-test stores as a control for the test stores because post period shocks
in demand are allowed to vary by state.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Store Level Data
From the store level data, we construct Table 1 which provides some preliminary evidence
for stockpiling. Although there can be many different definitions of a sale, we are fortunate
to have one variable labeled shelf/regular price and one labeled paid price. Thus, we look at
different definitions of a sale by defining it as any price 5, 10, 25, or 50 percent below the regular
price. First note that for any definition of a sale, the percent quantity sold is higher than the
percentage of weeks it is on sale. For example, a sale price defined to be 5% below regular price
occurs 18%, 30%, and 24% for mouthwash, diapers, and chocolate bars respectively, whereas
the quantity sold is 42%, 56%, and 47%. It seems unlikely that a pure increase in consumption
can fully explain this large increase in demand during sales. For example, suppose for the
moment that consumers draw randomly over the distribution of prices over time and simply
buy for consumption reasons. This would imply that consumers roughly double their use of
mouthwash and diapers, and eat twice as many chocolate bars during a sale. Although this
hypothetical result might be palatable for chocolate bars, it seems less plausible for mouthwash
and certainly for diapers given the nature of the products. Using the sale definition of 5% below
shelf price, The last row of Table 1 presents the average percent discount conditional on a sale.
The discounts are all above 15% where the highest percent discount is in the chocolate category
at 22.2%.
One of the predictions of a consumer inventory model is that demand accumulates over time
as stockpiled product at home is consumed. For example, quantity sold during sale periods
should be higher the longer the duration from previous sale as consumers use up their stock of
product at home in the interim period. Models like Sobel (1984) also make the same prediction,
but for durable goods. The basic intuition is that there exists a mass of price-sensitive consumers
every period that accumulates over time, and a firm will run a short-term price promotion to
capture sales from those consumers. The longer the firm waits till the next promotion, the
larger the mass of price-sensitive consumers and the stronger the incentive to run a promotion.
However, it is unclear how to extend this argument to our setting of non-durable goods that
are purchased frequently. The essence of the Sobel model is that there is a mass of price-
sensitive consumers that normally do not purchase, and that this mass accumulates since the
previous sale. We believe there are two ways in which the Sobel model may apply. First,
every period there is a new wave of potential customers that have just entered the market.
A fraction of these customers might be risk-averse, and do not purchase the product because
they are uncertain of its quality. Firms might run a promotion to induce trial and the number
of risk-averse consumers accumulates since the previous sale. The second way in which the
Sobel model may apply is to focus on price-sensitive consumers who purchase only during a
sale and never at normal price. Whether the Sobel model applies depends on the storability
of the product. If the good is not storable, then there is no accumulation of demand over
time because you only purchase what you consume that period, so the Sobel model does not
apply. If the good is storable, then price-sensitive consumers accumulate demand over time as
they finish consuming their product at home. A prediction that would distinguish between the
two theories is to look at how duration from previous sale affects quantity sold during nonsale
periods. The stockpiling hypothesis implies that inventories go down monotonically after a sale,
and consequently quantity sold during both sale and nonsale periods should be affected while
the Sobel model only applies to sale periods. Unfortunately, our empirical results are mixed
and do not show this phenomenon, although we believe that some features of the data prevent
us from observing this which we will discuss at the end of this subsection.
In Table 2, the dependent variable is In(quantity), the natural log of quantity and the
independent variables are ln(price), the natural log of price, DurationPS, the duration from
previous sale, and the square of DurationPS. For each product category, we have results from
both sale and nonsale periods. For sale periods, the coefficient on DurationPS is positive as
predicted by both the consumer inventory model as well as the Sobel model. The square of
DurationPS is negative but for most of our data, the marginal effect will still be the same sign
as the un-squared variable. For mouthwash and diapers, the coefficient is 0.014 and 0.025 where
both are statistically significant. In other words, during sale periods, more product is sold when
the duration since previous sale is higher as individuals deplete more of their inventory. For
chocolate, the coefficient is very small and insignificant at 0.006. Duration does not matter
for chocolate bars which would lend support to the notion that consumers do not stockpile
individually wrapped chocolate bars.
The results for the nonsale columns do not provide any additional evidence for stockpiling.
The coefficient on DurationPS are mostly negative or close to zero and the only the product
category that has a statistically significant coefficient is mouthwash of -0.027. Although this is
the opposite of what we expected, there are a couple reasons why we may be obtaining these
results. For one, our retailer is one that offers convenience albeit at higher prices for their
products, so that we do not observe the bulk of purchases that may be going on in other lower-
cost retailers. Thus, consumers in general may be less aware of the occurrence of the previous
sale because it is more likely they made their purchases in a different retailer not in our data
set. This would suggest our results for the sales period discussed in the previous paragraph
to be more robust, and would partially explain the insignificant coefficients during the nonsale
periods.
2.5.2 Individual Level Data
In this section, we present results using individual level data, but not including field ex-
periment data which we look at in the next section. In Table 3, we compare for each product
category the averages of different variables during sale and nonsale purchases. The first column
is the average of the variable during nonsale periods across both individuals and time. The next
column labeled total, is the average difference between sale and nonsale periods. For mouth-
wash, the average nonsale purchase is about 27.1 ounces while during a sale purchase, quantity
purchased increases by 12.4 ounces. This reflects both a within individual effect as well as a
between effect. The within effect measures how much quantity increases during a sale versus
a nonsale purchase for a given individual, which removes the selection bias by controlling for
individual level variables. The between effect looks at variation across the individuals' propen-
sity to purchase on sale, and its effect on quantity. In other words, it is an empirical test of the
assumption that deal-prone individuals purchase more quantity. Continuing with our example,
a given individual will purchase on average eight more ounces on a sale versus a nonsale pur-
chase (within effect) which reflects both stockpiling and consumption effects. Looking at the
between effect, those individuals who purchase say 10% more on sale will buy 1.4 more ounces
on average, corroborating our assumption of deal-prone individuals purchasing more quantity.
Thus, the total increase in quantity of 12.4 ounces overestimates the within effect.
Unsurprisingly, sale purchases are higher for all three product categories for the within
individual effect. Focusing on the within column for diapers, consumers purchase more quantity
mainly by purchasing more units as opposed to larger size packages, as seen by the coefficient
on units of 0.25, an increase of about 23% over nonsale purchases while the within coefficient
on size of 0.61 is only about 2% over nonsale purchases of 30.35 count packages of diapers. For
mouthwash, the within coefficients of units and size of 0.22 and 5.15 relative to their nonsale
levels indicate that consumers purchase both more units and larger sizes. For chocolate most
of the increase in quantity during a sale can be attributed to an increase the number of units
sold as the coefficient on the size variable is close to zero. In other words, both king-size and
regular sized chocolate bars sell more during a sale. Showing that quantity increases during a
sale however, is consistent with both stockpiling as well is the alternative hypothesis of increased
consumption.
We show how a purchase made during a sale is correlated with the number of days from
the shopper's previous purchase (DaysPP), and his next purchase(DaysNP) in rows 4 and 5
in Table 3. The coefficient on DaysPP should be negative during a sale because consumers
who want to reap the benefits of the current lower price, will make a purchase even if their
stockpiles are high. Alternatively, purchases during nonsale periods are made when stockpiles
are at much lower levels or only when necessary, which would imply that consumers have made
their last purchase quite some time ago. For the last row, the coefficient on DaysNP should be
positive because after a sale purchase you replenish your stockpile at home and will wait longer
until the next purchase. Our results are mixed on this issue, but we present these results in
any case for completeness as they will be used in calculations for Table 4.
Focusing on the within column for row four, both mouthwash and diapers have a positive
coefficient at 1.19 and 2.35 respectively, although the standard error for the product category
mouthwash is very large. For the product category chocolate, the coefficient is of the expected
sign at -2.97 and is statistically significant. In the last row, the only significant coefficient is for
mouthwash at 3.81 and it is of the expected sign. For diapers and chocolate, both coefficients
are negative and relatively small, but are statistically insignificant. One of the reasons we
believe that many of the coefficients are insignificant and fairly small is because as mentioned
before, purchases are very infrequent for the customers in our database.
Now looking at the between effects, we look at how individuals who tend to purchase more
on sale are different from those who purchase during nonsales. The effects are fairly large
and very significant for the quantity, units, and size variables which would imply there is
much heterogeneity in purchasing patterns for deal-prone individuals versus non-deal-prone
individuals. For example, for diapers the between effect on quantity is 18.2, double the within
effect of 9.0. The result is similar for mouthwash and chocolate as well. This implies that
those individuals that purchase more on sale, purchase more quantity. On the flip side of the
same coin, when there is a sale you are more likely to observe individuals that are more deal
prone and hence purchase more quantity. The between coefficients on units and size indicate
that more deal prone individuals purchase more units, as well as much larger sizes in both the
mouthwash and diapers categories.
In Table 4, we attempt to quantify the bias in demand elasticities with a simple exercise as
in Hendel and Nevo (2002). To calculate the short run elasticities, we divide the percent change
in total quantity sold during a sale (first row of Table 3) with the average price percent decline
(last row of Table 1). For example, during a sale mouthwash quantity increases by 12.4 ounces
which is 46% higher than nonsale quantity and the average price decline given a sale is 16.6%.
This leads to a short run elasticity of 2.76. Next, we compute the adjusted elasticity by purging
for both the stockpiling effect and the bias associated with the changing profile of individuals
who purchase during sales by using within changes in quantity. To purge for the stockpiling
effect, their idea is to spread the purchases after a sale over the longer durations to next purchase
to proxy for the extra consumption induced by the lower prices. For example, dividing quantity
sold during a sale 27.12 +12.43 by the days to next purchase 55.31+ 3.35 gives the consumption
rate after a sale. During a nonsale, the consumption rate is 27.12 / 55.31. The ratio of the
two numbers yields 1.21 which implies the duration corrected consumption change in Table 4
is 21%. Again, this attempts to measures the increase in pure consumption due to the price
increase. Finally, we divide by the appropriate percent decline during a sale to obtain a measure
of adjusted elasticity. In the case of mouthwash, we find evidence of stockpiling as the duration
corrected consumption change is lower than the within change in quantity bought. However,
for diapers and chocolate since during a sale the days to next purchase did not increase, the
stockpiling effect in this exercise is zero, and the duration corrected consumption change is the
same as the actual change in within quantity. For mouthwash, the short run elasticity is more
than twice that of the adjusted elasticity. For diapers and chocolate, the bias is still greater
than one even when there is no stockpiling effect.
We further discuss the selection bias when there is no stockpiling effect. For mouthwash,
diapers, and chocolate the bias is 53%, 47%, and 31% respectively. To reiterate, during a sale
the profile of shoppers who purchase are people who are more sales prone, and also happen to be
the ones that also purchase more quantity as seen by the positive coefficient in Table 3 for the
between effect on quantity in every product category. Consequently, this reveals a different bias
in the short run elasticity not associated with stockpiling. When a store runs a price promotion,
they will see a huge increase in demand both because every individual purchases more (within
effect), and the profile of shoppers who are more deal prone, purchase a higher-level quantity.
This reveals that individual level data is important for dealing with selection bias.
2.5.3 Field Experiment Data
In this section, we attempt to directly measure the consumption effect using field exper-
iment data. We include individual fixed effects, as we saw the importance of purging for the
selection bias in the last section. When using historical data that contains short-term price
promotions, the resulting increase in quantity we observe is composed of both a consumption
effect and a stockpiling effect. Our approach is to utilize the long-term drop in price level in
the test stores to identify just the consumption effect.
The empirical strategy is to use a differences-in-differences type estimator, to quantify the
increase in quantity due to the manipulation. A summary of the results from Table 5 and Table
6 are located in Table 7. In Table 5, the dependent variable is quantity and the coefficient of
interest in the first row is the Test * Post variable. The results here are striking. The decrease
in prices, when controlling for individual fixed effects has no effect on the quantity as seen
by the coefficients of -0.42 for mouthwash, and 0.03 for chocolate. Our interpretation is that
the consumption effect is close to zero for these two product categories. For diapers, we see a
somewhat economically significant coefficient of 7.48 which is a 12% increase in quantity over the
average purchase although it is statistically insignificant. At first glance, this is puzzling given
that we posited diapers was a product category that potentially had the smallest consumption
effect. However, since our data only includes one retailer, substitution away from other retailers
could explain this result. While we do not have data from other retailers, we further investigate
this by looking at how the number of shopping trips changes in the post test period.
The dependent variable in Table 6, Shoppingtrips, is defined as the frequency of visits
to a store that results in a purchase. The coefficient of interest is on the first row for the
variable Test * Post where a summary of the results are also in Table 7. For both mouthwash
and chocolate, again the coefficient is close to zero and insignificant. For diapers, the number
of shopping trips are large and significant which indicates the number of visits to the diaper
category increased by 11%. There are at least a couple reasons why we believe this indicates
that shoppers are shifting their diaper purchases from other outlets into our test stores. For
one, there is no need for a shopper to make more visits to purchase more quantity if their
inventory is not at full capacity. Given that we see an equal percentage increase in both the
number of shopping trips and the quantity purchased, we feel that at least some of the increase
in shopping trips is due to consumers substituting their weekly purchases into our retailer.
Second, as noted before, since the percentage of weeks that have a sale does not go up in the
test stores relative to control stores during the experiment, and in fact goes down slightly,
price-sensitive shoppers who search for sales are not driving the result of increased number of
shopping trips in the test stores. Third, diapers are a product that is relatively expensive and
used quite often as any parent knows. Thus the potential savings gained from shopping around
and locating lower-priced retailers yields huge benefits. Although we cannot completely rule out
that the consumption effect is largely positive for diapers, it is very plausible that the increase
in quantity from our regressions reflects at least in part substitution away from other stores.
2.6 Conclusion
Consumer stockpiling behavior has received considerable interest in the recent economics
literature due to the implications it has on demand estimation. As long-run or consumption
elasticities are usually of interest to researchers, it is important to purge the other effects. With
individual level data, we are able to net out the selection bias due to deal-prone individuals
shopping more during sales by controlling for individual-level traits. We find this bias to be
in the range of 30 to 50 percent. Our field experiment data includes a long term decrease in
price which isolates the consumption effect. Our results suggest that consumption elasticities
are actually very small, which implies that stockpiling may compose a substantial portion of
the short-run elasticity identified with short-term sales.
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Table 1
Percent of Weeks on Sale in Quantity Sold on Sale,
by Category for Different Definitions of Sale
Mouthwash Diapers Chocolate
Weeks on Quantity Weeks on Quantity Weeks on Quantity
sale sold sale sold sale sold
Sale is any price less than:
<Shelf price 26.7% 57.5% 41.8% 71.9% 39.4% 68.7%
<0.95*shelf price 17.9% 42.0% 29.8% 55.6% 24.0% 46.7%
<0.90*shelf price 12.2% 36.3% 22.8% 48.3% 19.2% 42.0%
<0.75*shelf price 2.6% 14.5% 4.6% 14.7% 7.2% 23.1%
<0.50*shelf price 0.3% 3.9% 0.3% 1.1% 0.4% 6.3%
avg % discount
given a salet 16.6% 17.5% 22.2%
tSale is defined for any price 5% below shelf price.
Table 2
Demand as a Function of Duration from Previous Promotional Activity
Mouthwash Diapers Chocolate
Dependent
Variable
In(price)
DurationPS
(DurationPS) 2
Store dummies
Brand dummies
In(quantity) In(quantity) In(quantity) In(quantity)
Sale Nonsale Sale Nonsale
In(quantity) In(quantity)
Sale Nonsale
-1.61 -1.18 -1.39 -1.58 -2.42 -1.51
(0.056) (0.026) (0.081) (0.071) (0.055) (0.161)
0.014
(0.0067)
-0.027
(0.00303)
0.025
(0.0125)
-0.00034 0.000520 -0.00133
(0.00017) (0.00008) (0.00063)
Yes
Yes
N = 656
Yes
Yes
4844
Yes
Yes
1573
-0.0041
(0.00874)
0.006
(0.0057)
0.00005
(0.00190)
0.000358 -0.00044 0.000054
(0.00048) (0.00023) (0.00006)
Yes
Yes
5554
Yes
Yes
1305
Yes
Yes
5808
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation is a brand-size combination in a
store. Duration from previous sale is the number of weeks since last sale for that brand-size in
that store. Each regression includes seasonal month dummies.
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Table 4
Consumption versus Stockpiling Effects
Mouthwash Diapers Chocolate
Total change in quantity
bought
Short-run elasticity
Within change in quantity
bought
Duration corrected
consumption change
Adjusted elasticity
Bias (ratio Elast/Adjusted
Elast)
Notes: Based on the figures reported in table
discussion in text for exact definitions.
1 and table 3 and author's calculations. See
46%
2.76
30%
21%
1.28
2.16
39%
2.25
27%
27%
1.53
1.47
51%
2.29
39%
39%
1.75
1.31
Table 5
Consumption Effect - Field Experiment Data
Mouthwash Diapers Chocolate
Dependent
Variable
Test*Post
Post
State 1 *Post
State2*Post
State3*Post
State4 *Post
State5*Post
Seasonal
dummies
Individual fixed
effects
quantity
-0.42
(3.18)
-14.29
(2.32)
-9.12
(4.77)
-1.28
(5.65)
5.93
(3.37)
3.33
(3.98)
0.95
(3.69)
Yes
Yes
quantity
7.48
(6.28)
-14.92
(7.15)
-18.47
(10.81)
6.68
(11.65)
-0.61
(9.05)
-3.10
(8.67)
-8.91
(9.87)
quantity
0.03
(0.12)
-0.48
(0.10)
-0.21
(0.20)
-0.39
(0.28)
-0.51
(0.14)
-0.12
(0.15)
-0.24
(0.16)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation is an individual-quarter- brand-size
combination. Includes those customers that purchased at least one unit in the pre-period and spent
at least $100 in both the pre and the post period for any product category.
Table 6
Substitution from Other Retailers - Field Experiment Data
Mouthwash Diapers Chocolate
Dependent Variable
Test*Post
Post
State I *Post
State2*Post
State3*Post
State4*Post
State5*Post
Seasonal dummies
Individual fixed
effects
Shoppingtrips
-0.04
(0.08)
-0.40
(0.06)
-0.14
(0.12)
0.12
(0.14)
0.10
(0.08)
0.17(0.10)
0.15
(0.09)
Yes
Yes
Shoppingtrips
0.25
(0.12)
-0.34
(0.14)
-0.24
(0.21)
0.26
(0.23)
-0.06
(0.18)
-0.03
(0.17)
-0.19
(0.19)
Yes
Yes
Shoppingtrips
0.05
(0.04)
-0.18
(0.04)
-0.18
(0.08)
-0.32
(0.11)
-0.18
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.10
(0.06)
Yes
Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each observation is an individual-quarter- brand-
size combination. Includes those customers that purchased at least one unit in the pre-period
and spent at least $100 in both the pre and the post period for any product category.
Table 7
Consumption Effect Calculations
Mouthwash Diapers Chocolate
Quantity
Baseline pre-period 35.32 63.04 2.2
DID (Post*Test table 5) -0.42 7.48 0.03
percent change 0% 12% 1%
Shopping trips
Baseline pre-period 1.55 2.29 2.03
DID (Post*Test table 6) -0.37 0.25 0.05
percent change 0% 11% 2%
Notes: Based on the figures reported in table 5 and table 6 and author's calculations. See
discussion in text for exact definitions.
Chapter 3
Lower Prices vs. Merely Claiming
Prices are Lower
3.1 Introduction
Firms sometimes charge low prices, other times they merely claim that they have low prices.
We compare the effectiveness of both strategies. We begin by investigating whether the two
strategies are effective on the same items, or whether they are more effective on different types
of items. The answer reveals whether firms will tend to claim that prices are low on items
that they also prefer to charge low prices. This has important implications for the credibility
of the claims. Second, we investigate how the accuracy with which customers can recall prices
moderate the response to either strategy.
While research elsewhere confirms that simply claiming prices are low can be effective, the
effectiveness diminishes the more often this claim is used. It is generally not profitable to use
"Sale" signs or other low price claims on every product, and so firms must choose where to use
them. There are two competing theories about where the claims will be most effective. One
theory argues that when demand is sensitive to lowering the price it will also be sensitive to
claiming the price is low. An alternative theory suggests the opposite: demand will be more
sensitive to low price claims when demand is unresponsive to price changes.
These opposing predictions reflect different moderating effects: how much customers care
about prices, and how much they know about prices. When customers care more about prices
we would expect them to be sensitive to both actual and perceived price levels. This argues
for a positive correlation in the response to both actual and claimed price reductions. On the
other hand, it has been argued elsewhere (Anderson and Simester 1998) that customers are
more responsive to "Sale" signs and other low price claims when they cannot evaluate whether
a price is low. This may lead to a negative correlation: if customers can evaluate prices they are
more responsive to actual price changes. However, if price knowledge is poor, customer are less
responsive to actual price changes and instead are more likely to respond to low price claims,
such as Sale signs.
We investigate these opposing predictions using a large-scale field test in which we varied
actual and claimed price levels on a sample of 192 items in a chain of convenience stores.
Our findings reveal that the response to the two strategies is positively correlated. Items that
respond strongly to price reductions also respond strongly to claims that prices are low.
These findings contribute to our understanding of why "Sale" signs and other low price
claims are effective. Positive correlation in the response to price cuts and Sale signs suggests
that firms will prefer to put Sale signs on items that are truly discounted. This reinforces earlier
theoretical arguments that Sale signs provide uninformed customers with a credible signal that
an item is discounted.
3.2 Literature Review
The economic theory of why Sale signs and other low price claims are effective interprets
the claims as a signaling mechanism. Customers who are poorly informed about future prices
or prices at competing stores use the claims to evaluate whether to purchase immediately or
search for lower prices elsewhere. Anderson and Simester (1998) provide a signaling model
where if customers believe that products with sales signs are more likely to be discounted then
firms prefer to place sale signs on their discounted products. In equilibrium, they also show
that while firms are tempted to place sale signs on nonpromoted products, doing so can result
in lower profits as customers infer that the cue is less credible. This provides a self-regulating
mechanism to prevent the firm from overusing sale signs. They provide empirical evidence that
a customer's responsiveness to a sale sign decreases as you place more of them in the store. On
a related note, customers may rely on other types of signals to inform them of lower prices.
For example, Simester (1995) demonstrates prices of advertised products can be a signal of the
price of a firm's unadvertised products, when prices are correlated across products.
Price signaling theories depend on customers having imperfect price knowledge. Dickson
and Sawyer (1990) find that customers who had just recently purchased a product could recall
the correct price only half of the time. Subsequent research has confirmed their findings and
has focused on identifying the determinants of price knowledge. While many different prod-
uct characteristics have been identified as potential drivers of price knowledge (Anderson and
Simester 2003), we focus on purchase frequency and historical price variation, variables which
were readily available to us.
Claiming that a price is low raises ethical concerns if it misleads customers about the true
price levels. The evidence that we will present in this paper suggests that low price claims are
at least partially self-regulating. The results suggest that firms will prefer to use these claims on
items for which prices are truly low. We recognize that this self-regulation may not be sufficient
and so, while beyond the scope of this paper, study of the inherent ethical issues is called for.
Such a review would be particularly valuable given the very widespread use of low price claims
in both retail and industrial settings. We certainly do not intend that readers interpret our
results as a recommendation that firms engage in unethical practices.
3.3 Design of the Study
The study was conducted with a large retail chain of convenience stores. The stores sell a
typical array of private label and national brand items in the grocery, health and beauty and
general merchandise categories. The stores are smaller than most supermarkets and are located
in convenient residential and urban locations. At the time of the study the firm also operated
an Internet channel but few customers purchased through this channel.
The field test was conducted in eighteen stores located within approximately five miles of
each other in the metropolitan area of a major US city. The study involved a total of 192
Test Items. When selecting the items from the 20,000 SKUs sold by the retailer, we sought to
limit any cross-product demand affects. We did not want the experimental manipulations on
one Test Item to affect demand for other Test Items. We began by randomly selecting a single
item from each product category and then removed items where the research team or managers
thought there was a possible substitute or complement relationship.
The experimental design included three experimental conditions:
Sale Condition: A Sale sign was attached to the shelf.
Discount Condition: The price was reduced by 12%.
Control: No change.
In the Sale condition a 2" x 2" sticker was affixed to the shelf. The sticker had the words
"LOW prices" in a red circle on a yellow background, as depicted in Figure 1. The price
was left unchanged at the regular price. In the Control condition the price was reduced by
12%. This was an unannounced price reduction - there were no "LOW prices" stickers or any
other indications that the price had been changed. In the Control condition the price was left
unchanged (at the regular price) and there was again no sticker or other announcement of a
price change.
Ideally the study would have included a fourth condition, in which prices were reduced and
the "LOW prices" sticker was used. This would have allowed us to measure the interaction
between the two treatments. However, adding an additional condition was not feasible.
The "LOW prices" proclamation on the sticker was intentionally ambiguous. For legal
reasons the sticker does not make an explicit claim that the price of that item was reduced.
We might expect more explicit Sale claims to yield larger demand effects. However, our focus
is on comparing the impact of this cue across items. Because we used the same sticker on each
item, the "LOW prices" wording does not limit our ability to compare outcomes across items.
Similarly, use of a 12% price reduction in the Discount condition would be expected to yield
different demand effects than smaller or larger price reductions.
In order to control for store effects we rotated the experimental treatments across the 18
stores. The 192 items were randomly assigned to six "product groups" and the stores were
randomly assigned to three "store groups". We then rotated the experimental treatments
across the product and store groups as illustrated in Table 1. The study ran for 17 weeks
between April, 2006 and July, 2006.
3.4 Preliminary Results
A total of approximately 500,000 units of the 192 Test Items were purchased during the 17
weeks of the study. We received transaction data describing the number of units of each item
purchased in each store in each week, together with the price paid and the wholesale cost of
those purchases. We use this data to construct three dependent measures in the analysis that
follows: demand (units purchased), revenue (amount paid) and profit (revenue minus cost of
goods sold).
We report preliminary results using two approaches. First, we aggregate across items and
calculate total demand, revenue, and profit by condition. We then use these aggregate measures
to calculate the percentage change in the discount and LOW prices conditions compared to the
control. By aggregating across items we effectively give greater weight to items that have more
demand. Therefore, in our second approach we calculate the effect for each item and then
average across the 192 items. The findings from both approaches are reported in Table 2.
Both approaches yield a similar pattern of results. As expected, the 12% discount and the
LOW prices sticker resulted in significant increases in demand. However, the impact on revenue
and profits was different across the two conditions. Because the prices (and profit margin) were
left unchanged in the LOW prices condition, the demand increase in this condition resulted
in both higher revenue and higher profits. In the discount condition the demand increase was
offset by the 12% price reduction, with the result that revenue and profit actually fell in this
condition.
A 17.1% demand increase when the price is lowered by 12% equates to a price elasticity of
-1.4, while a 13.2% increase corresponds to an elasticity of -1.1. This suggests that we should
have observed an increase in revenue in the discount condition. We observe the opposite result,
suggesting that the demand increase was not uniform across all of the products and instead
resulted in larger demand changes amongst products at lower price levels. We will investigate
this and other interactions later in the paper when we evaluate factors that moderate the impact
of the two treatments.
While these preliminary results serve as a reassuring manipulation check, they are not the
primary focus of this paper. Instead we focus on understanding how the impact of the two
experimental treatments varied across the different items. We begin to address this issue in the
next section.
3.5 Correlation in The Impact of the Treatments Across Dif-
ferent Items
In this section we investigate whether the two treatments were more effective on the same
items or on different items. In particular, we measure the correlation in the discount and LOW
prices responses across the 192 items.
We begin by calculating the percentage change in demand, revenue and profit in the two
treatment conditions compared to the control condition for each item:
Treatment - Control
%Change = (1)Control
This is the same approach that we used to calculate the item-level results in Table 2. We
then calculated the correlation in this metric across the two treatments. These correlations are
reported in Table 3. They reveal strong positive correlation in all three outcome measures.
The relationships are illustrated in scatter plots in Figures 2a - 2c. Each point represents the
%Change outcomes for a single item under the two treatments. To protect the confidentiality
of the data the outcomes are rescaled onto a 1 to 7 scale (using the same re-scaling for each
metric). These figures reveal that there is an outlying result for one item that contributed
to the positive correlation (depicted in the top right corner of each figure). Omitting this
outlying observation lowers the correlations to 0.51, 0.49 and 0.36 for the demand, revenue and
profit outcomes (respectively). The results are also robust to estimating the effects for each
products using Poisson regression. This approach yields almost identical correlations between
the outcomes for the two treatment conditions.
Notice that the calculation of the % Change metric in Equation 1 compares demand in stores
that received the respective treatments with demand in the control stores (that did not receive
either treatment). As a result, the outcomes for both treatments are calculated using demand
in a common set of control stores. It is possible that stochastic variation in demand in these
control stores may have contributed to the positive correlations in these estimated outcomes.
To investigate this possibility we repeated the analysis when using half of the control stores
to estimate the impact of the discount and the other half to estimate the impact of the LOW
prices sticker. Specifically, for each item we randomly assigned three of the six control stores
as controls in the discount calculation and the other three as controls in the LOW prices
calculation. This replication yielded correlations of 0.26, 0.26 and 0.22 for the demand, revenue
and profit outcomes. This replication is reassuring and confirms that the positive correlation
cannot be fully explained by the use of common control stores. It is possible that the reduction
in the magnitudes of the three correlations may partly be explained by removal of this effect.
However, the changes may also simply reflect the loss of information when we estimate the
outcomes using demand from fewer stores.
The positive correlation in these coefficients confirms that items for which there is a greater
response to the price cue are also items for which there is more price sensitivity. This supports
the interpretation that when customers care more about prices they respond to both low prices
and claims that prices are low. It has two implications for the price signaling argument. First,
it suggests that firms will want to claim that prices are lower on items for which prices truly are
low. As we discussed, this outcome is fundamental to the credibility of Sale signs and other low
price claims. Second, the price signaling argument predicts that we should observe a greater
response to price reductions when customers' price knowledge is good, and a greater response
to low price claims when their price knowledge is poor. This could lead to a negative correlation
across products in the response to the two treatments. We caution that the evidence that this
correlation is positive does not imply that this signaling theory is wrong. The two theories are
antithetic, and so it is possible that the negative correlation predicted by the signaling argument
is overwhelmed by the positive correlation from customers caring more about prices on some
items than others.
In the next section we evaluate whether the outcomes to the two treatments were moderated
by customers' knowledge of the prices of each item.
3.6 The Role of Customers' Price Knowledge
We use two approaches to measure customers' knowledge of prices. The first approach
focuses on item characteristics that are likely to contribute to the accuracy of customers' price
knowledge. In particular, we consider the frequency with which the items are purchased and
the historical variation in the regular price. We would expect customers to have better knowl-
edge of the prices of items that they purchase frequently, such as soda, milk and bread. In
contrast, when the regular price of an item changes frequently, perhaps because of seasonal
price fluctuations, we expect customers' price knowledge to be relatively poor.
To construct measures of historical purchase frequency and price variation for the 192 items
we obtained data describing over 5 million individual transactions by a randomly selected
sample of approximately 650,000 customers. The transactions were identified from the retailer's
frequent shopping card and the customers had all made at least one purchase at one of the 18
stores involved in the test. The transactions include every purchase made using a customer's
frequent shopping card in the 20 months before the start of the test, including purchases at
stores other than the 18 stores in the test. We used this data to calculate two measures:
Purchase Frequencyi The number of times that product i was purchased by this
sample of customers in the 20 months before the test.
Price Variations The coefficient of variation in the regular price of item i across
this historical sample of purchases. This was calculated as ui/ pi,
where ai and ii denote the standard deviation and average of
the regular price (respectively).
The two measures are not significantly correlated across the 192 products. There is a
significant negative correlation between Purchase Frequency and the Regular Price of an item
(p=-0.19) but the Regular Price is not correlated with the Price Variation measure.
Our second approach to measuring price knowledge was to ask a sample of actual customers
how accurately they could recall the prices of the 192 items used in the experiment. The price
recall measures were collected by a team of research assistants in two of the retailer's stores.
The research assistants approached customers standing in check out lines waiting to complete
their transactions. Customers were asked to participate in "a short survey about products
and prices that takes roughly four and a half minutes". They were offered a free $5 gift card
for participating. Pretests confirmed that the survey was generally completed in under five
minutes. The response rate averaged approximately 60%.
Respondents were each shown actual examples of eight of the Test Items and asked: "What
is your best guess of the price that [store name] normally charges for this item?" Respondents in
the pretest were asked to describe in their own words to the interviewer what was meant by this
question. Their responses confirmed that they had little difficulty interpreting the question.
The Test Items were randomly assorted into groups of eight items, and these groups were
then rotated across the customers. A total of 783 customers responded to the survey, which
yielded a total of 5,969 usable price recall measures across the 192 Test Items. This represents
an average of just over 31 responses per item. All items had at least 25 responses and no items
had more than 32 responses (the variation reflects the random assignment of products to survey
groups). Customers were also asked whether they had seen the prices of any of the items in the
store on that visit. This occurred for just 1% (64) of the price recall responses, and omitting
these observations has no affect on the results.
We used the 5,969 responses to calculate the following measure of price recall accuracy:
Accuracyi The percentage of customers who recalled a price within 10% of the regular
price. The regular price was the price charged in the control and LOW prices
conditions (and at other neighboring stores) during the test period.
Summary statistics for this accuracy measure are reported in Table 4, together with the
correlation between this measure and the regular price, price variation, and purchase frequency
measures. The 10% standard for evaluating accuracy is somewhat arbitrary and so for com-
pleteness we report summary statistics when setting the standard at 20% and 30%. As we
would expect, the results that follow are robust to changes in this accuracy standard. On
average 17.8% of responses were within 10% of the actual price, though there is considerable
variation across items. For one item almost 60% of the responses were correct (within 10%),
while at the other extreme, none of the responses were correct for five of the items.
Given that the margin of error is defined as a percentage of the regular price we might
expect that the accuracy of the responses would be larger for items with higher prices (10%
of a $6 item is 60-cents, while 10% of a $2 item is just 20-cents). In fact the reverse is true;
accuracy is weakly negatively correlated with the regular price. As predicted, accuracy also
improves with the frequency with which the item is purchased. On the other hand the accuracy
measure is essentially uncorrelated with the level of variation in the regular price.
We next investigate whether the response to the discounts and "LOW prices" sticker was
moderated by our measures of price knowledge.
3.7 Moderation of the Response to the Experimental Treat-
ments
We use a multivariate approach to directly estimate how the measures of price knowledge
interacted with the response to the two treatments. We focus on the change in demand. Because
the demand variable is a count measure, our multivariate analysis uses Poisson regression. In
particular, we assume that the number of units of product i sold in week t in store s(Qits) is
drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter Aits:
eAitsAits
Pr(Qits = q) = ,qe= 0, 1, 2,... (2)
where: ln(Aits) = p x Xits. The Xit, term denotes the independent variables, while /
denotes the estimated coefficients. We estimate the following equations for In(Aits) :
ln(Aits) = a + p -Discountis + 2 - LOWpricesis (2a)
ln(Aits) = a + -Discounti, + /2 -LOWpricesis + 03 -Accuracyi (2b)
+/4 - Discounti, * Accuracyi + /5 - LOWpricesis * Accuracyi
The Discount and LOW prices variables are defined as follows:
Discounti, Equal to 1 if item i was discounted in store s and zero otherwise.
LOWpricesis Equal to 1 if item i had a "LOW prices" sticker in store s and zero
otherwise.
Under the specification in Equation 2a, the i1 and /2 coefficients measure the percentage
change in demand attributable to the discounts and LOW prices sticker (respectively). In
Equation 2b the interaction coefficients 04 and /5 measure how the outcome is moderated by
the accuracy with which customers recall prices. We also estimate versions of Equation 2b
where we replace the Accuracy variable with Purchase Frequency, Price Variation and Regular
Price, and a model in which we include all of the interaction terms. To aid interpretation, the
Accuracy, Purchase Frequency, Price Variation and Regular Price variables are all standardized
so that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The equations are all estimated using 58,752 observations, representing demand for the 192
items in the 18 stores across the 17 weeks. In Table 5 we report the equivalent of the 04 and 35
coefficients from a model that includes all of the interactions. Complete results are reported in
Table 6, where we also report models in which the interactions are included in separate models.
The results in Table 5 describe how the response to each treatment changes if the moderating
variables are higher or lower than their average values. For example, on items for which the
Accuracy of customers' price recall is one standard deviation above the average Accuracy, the
response to the discount treatment is 33% larger, but the response to the LOW prices treatment
is 29% lower.
Before presenting the results, we caution that the estimates are sensitive to outliers with high
demand. While this is an undesirable outcome for the model, we include them for two reasons.
One, since demand is higher for these products, the impact of the treatment on quantity is
estimated more precisely than products that are rarely purchased. Two, they are the products
for which we might expect price knowledge is better, contributing to the variation needed to
estimate the parameters for Accuracy and Purchase Frequency.
The results in Table 5 reveal several findings of interest. First, the Accuracy interactions
confirm that customers respond more favorably to the 12% discount on items for which they
can more accurately recall prices. We see the opposite result for the LOW prices treatment,
where they react more favorably when customers are unable to accurately recall prices.
Second, we anticipated customers would have better price knowledge on items that they
purchase more frequently. The 12% discounts led to a bigger demand increase on items that
customers purchase frequently. In contrast, the response to the LOW prices sticker was larger if
the items are purchased infrequently. Recall also that we reported in Table 4 that the Purchase
Frequency and Accuracy measures are positively correlated. We might expect this correlation to
introduce multicollinearity. Indeed, we see evidence of collinearity when we compare the findings
from the complete model (Model 6 in Table 6) with a model in which we only introduce the
Purchase Frequency interaction (Model 3). The Purchase Frequency interaction is significantly
larger in Model 3, suggesting that at least part of the affect is absorbed by the Accuracy
interaction in the complete model.
Third, we predicted that customers would have better recall of the regular prices on items for
which there was less variation in the regular price. Although this prediction was not supported
by the correlations in Table 4, the Price Variation interactions are in the direction that we
would expect. On items for which there is more price variation customers are less responsive
to lower prices, but more responsive to claims that prices are low.
Fourth, the outcomes are also moderated by the regular price, though in this case the
interactions are in the same direction for both treatments. Customers are less responsive to
lowering the price or claims that the price is low when the regular price of the item is higher.
Finally, because the moderating variables were standardized, we can directly compare the
magnitude of the effects. It is clear that the Accuracy interactions are the dominant interaction.
Changes in this measure have a much greater moderating affect on the response to the two
treatments than variations in the other variables.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusions
The economic theory of why Sale signs and other low price claims are effective argues that
these claims perform a signaling role. Customers interpret the claims as cues that prices have
been reduced. The credibility of these cues depends critically on whether firms will prefer to
claim that prices are low when in reality they are low. Our findings provide a strong motivation
for firms to do so. On items that customers respond strongly to lower prices, they also respond
strongly to low price claims.
This positive correlation in the response to the two treatments supports the credibility of
the signaling interpretation. Yet, while the signaling theory depends upon this credibility, the
implications of the theory itself work at least partially against this positive correlation. In
particular, the theory predicts that low price claims will be most effective when customers are
unable to recall prices, while price changes will be least effective on these items. This introduces
an apparent dilemma for the signaling story: firms may want to lower the prices of some items
but claim they have lowered the prices of other items, yet this will undermine the credibility of
the low price claims.
The findings reveal that the credibility of the low price claims and the role of customers'
price knowledge are not mutually exclusive. The findings confirm that customers' price knowl-
edge does moderate the response to the two treatments in the way that the theory predicts.
Customers respond more to low prices on items for which they have good price knowledge, but
respond more to low price claims when their price knowledge is poor. Nevertheless the response
to the two treatments is positively correlated across the products. It appears that the negative
correlation introduced by price knowledge is overwhelmed by positive correlation introduced by
other factors. A likely explanation for this positive correlation is that customers simply care
more about the prices of some products than others.
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Figure 1. "LOW prices" shelf sticker
Table 1. Experimental Design
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Table 2. Item Level Results
Discount LOW prices
Aggregate Results
Demand
Revenue
Profit
Item Level Results
Demand
Revenue
Profit
Sample size
Standard errors are in parentheses.
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01.
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05.
tWe did not conduct significance tests on the aggregate revenue and profit
results.
Table 3. Correlation in the Response to the
Discount and LOW prices Treatments
Correlation
Demand 0.58**
Revenue 0.59**
Profit 0.47**
Sample size 192
Standard errors are in parentheses.
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01.
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05.
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Table 4. Price Recall Accuracy
Summary Statistics
Within 10% Within 20 % Within 30%
Mean 17.8%
Standard Deviation
Maximum
Minimum
Number of Items
Pairwise Correlations
Regular price
Purchase frequency
Price variation
11.5%
59.4%
0.0%
192
-0.15*
0.32**
0.04
30.6%
14.3%
70.0%
3.1%
192
-0.13
0.29**
0.05
Table 5. Summary of the Interactions
Discount LOW prices
Accuracy 33.3%** -29.1% **
Purchase Frequency 0.7%** -1.4%**
Price Variation -1.3%** 5.5%**
Regular Price -1.3%** -2.1%"
43.4%
16.9%
80.6%
6.5%
192
-0.14*
0.22**
0.09
Table 6. The Moderating Role of Price Knowledge
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Discount 0.158** -0.079** 0.086**(0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
LOW prices
Discount * Accuracy
LOW prices * Accuracy
Discount * Purchase
Frequency
LOW prices * Purchase
Frequency
Discount * Price Variation
LOW prices * Price
Variation
Discount * Regular Price
LOW prices * Regular Price
Accuracy
0.033**
(0.004)
0.219**
(0.008)
0.797**
(0.024)
-0.660**
(0.025)
0.081**
(0.005)
0.155**
(0.004)
0.035**
(0.004)
0.327**
(0.007)
0.041" **
(0.007)
0.028**
(0.001)
-0.021" **
(0.001)
-0.032**
(0.002)
0.072**
(0.004)
-0.063 **
(0.002)
6.394**
(0.018)
Purchase Frequency
Price Variation
Regular Price
Intercept
0.568**
(0.001)
2.074**
(0.003)
0.608**
(0.006)
1.614**
(0.003)
-0.058**
(0.003)
2.072**
(0.003)
0.075**
(0.010)
0.208**
(0.010)
0.333**
(0.034)
-0.291**
(0.035)
0.007**
(0.002)
-0.014**
(0.002)
-0.013**
(0.004)
0.055**
(0.004)
-0.013**
(0.002)
-0.003 -0.021**
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.020**
(0.003)
0.537**
(0.002)
-0.067**
(0.003)
-1.635**
(0.008)
1.596**
(0.004)
-0.422**
(0.006)
1.548**
(0.004)
Log likelihood
Sample size 58,752 58,752 58,752 58,752
The dependent variable measures the number of units of item i purchased in week t in store s. Asymptotic standard
errors are in parentheses.
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01.
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05.
58,75258,752
